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ABSTRACT:
This thesis examines how evolving norms of international climate change mitigation
are translated into national forest governance policies and land management
techniques in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The development of
administrative mechanisms to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation (REDD) become a cultural script through which the institutions of the
World Bank and the United Nations Development Program "prepare" the post-colonial
state to be a rational producer of avoided forest carbon emissions. The two actions-
building the state and stabilizing a commodifiable carbon-occur unconsciously as a
process Sheila Jasanoff calls "co-production," a dialectic in which efforts to change
the natural order depend on unquestioned ideas about the social order, and visa
versa. As this thesis shows, instrumental goals of making carbon governable in a
country bearing the heavy legacy of Belgian colonialism and the scars of the largest
regional war in recent African history, run a high risk of reproducing embedded
inequities found at the local level. The impacts of global climate change are expected
to have especially adverse affects on subsistence communities dependent on forest
resources for their daily existence. If REDD architecture would live up to its stated
goal of also improving livelihoods in the non-Annex I countries of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, it must engage in a more overtly "co-
productionist" politics of carbon management. This means developing overt
mechanisms that provide more continuous interactions between different epistemic
communities in the domestic REDD countries (international experts, national
administrators and local communities), linking local level institutions upward with
higher scales of administration in setting the rules for carbon management, as well
as strengthening community control of resources so that the decision to participate
in the provisioning of global public goods can be made with more autonomy.
Thesis Supervisor: Balakrishnan Rajagopal
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Congo: Symbol and Site
In his essay "How to Write about Africa", Binyavanga Wainaina instructs the would-be
observer and author of African affairs in the finer points of covering a tricky subject:
"Always use the word 'Africa' or 'Darkness' or 'Safari' in your title. Subtitles may
include the words 'Zanzibar', 'Masai', 'Zulu', 'Zambezi', 'Congo', 'Nile', 'Big', 'Sky',
'Shadow', 'Drum', 'Sun' or 'Bygone'. Also useful are words such as 'Guerrillas',
'Timeless', 'Primordial' and 'Tribal'."'
I violated Wainaina's first directive, but have duly followed his second: this thesis is
about modem development in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and its
connections to the science of climate change and the growing practice of international
carbon management. The Congo Basin of the DRC constitutes the second largest forest
domain in the world, after the Brazilian Amazon. Dense, humid rainforests, savanna
woodlands and deciduous forests lands cover roughly 60% of the country.2 These forests
directly support nearly a third of DRC's population. Roughly 21 million people live in
subsistence from the forest. Yet the conversion of global forests into other uses, including
in the DRC, contributes significant amounts of greenhouse gas emissions to the
atmosphere (largely through the burning of trees and release of sequestered carbon from
trunks and soil). According to latest estimates, anthropogenic deforestation and other land
use changes results in 17% of global GHG emissions a year. 3 International efforts to
reduce these emissions have brought attention to the value of keeping rainforests standing
and translating this value into administrative capacity and financial incentives that change
domestic trajectories of deforestation. 4
The DRC has traditionally very low rates of deforestation due to its low levels of
industrial development (0.25% forest loss over the period 1990-2000 compared to 4.56%
for Brazil)5 , but given the vast size of its forests, absolute forest loss is still high (3.7
million hectare reduction in forest cover for the period 2000-2010).6 As a result, the DRC
'Wainaina, Binyavanga, "How to Write about Africa", Granta 92: The Viewfrom Africa, 2005
(http://www.granta.com/Archive/92/How-to-Write-about-Africa/Page- 1).
2 See State of the Forests in the Congo Basin 2008. Eds : de Wasseige C.,, Publishing Office of the
European Union, Luxembourg, 2009.
3 See IPCC Assessment Report 4, 2007; more recent estimates (see in particular the Global Carbon Project
"Global Carbon Budget 2010" report; http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/index.htm) of
emissions from land use change indicate a 25% reduction in land use related emissions from the 1990s, the
period which constitute the main set of data for the IPCC AR4. Land use emission changes represent the
most uncertain element of overall global emissions.
4 In addition to the negative links between forests and total atmospheric emissions, tropical forests provide
a wide range of other ecological services, acting as major regulators of regional weather cycles through
evapo-transpiration, water capture and other biophysical properties that contribute to cloud formation,
rainfall patterns and soil formation.
5 For the Congo estimates see State of the Forests in the Congo Basin 2008; For Brazilian estimates see
INPE and FAO, 2008.
6 See Observatoire Satellitaire des For6ts d'Afrique Centrale (OSFAC) report Fordt D'Afrique Centrales
Evalude par tiditection : Atlas de l'etendue et de la perte du couvertforestier 2000-2010 en Republique
democratique du Congo (FACET), Kinshasa, 2011.
7has attracted the interest, and lobbied itself, to advance international negotiations through
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change on a finance mechanism
to reduce emission from deforestation and degradation of forests (REDD). From the
perspective of Jose Endundo, the Minister of Environment, "Climate change is a new
problem that we must attack intelligently and with a sense of responsibility toward [the
Congolese] people, who must not be excluded from a mechanism such as REDD. Our
people must be included, and they already are, in this process upon which the future of
humanity depends." 7 True to this rhetorical commitment, a diverse group of domestic
and external actors are in the process of constructing the means to manage Congolese
forests according to the quantity of carbon sequestered in its soils, roots and trees. This
thesis focuses on the most prominent of these external actors, the World Bank and the
United Nations, and how their preparation of the Congolese State to be a purveyor of
forest carbon to the global market is accompanied at the same time by the production of a
global carbon imaginary.
This analysis of the "co-production" of the developmental State and the entity of carbon
adapts methods and concerns developed in large parts by scholars of science and
technology studies. As Michael Lynch writes, "A familiar agenda in science and
technology studies is to expose sources of uncertainty and contingency that are hidden by
the successful genesis, stabilization and dissemination of facts and artifacts." 8 In
approaching forest carbon as a topic of study, we are not yet dealing with a
"successfully" naturalized entity. We are dealing with an example of what Sheila
Jasanoff calls "the emergence and stabilization of new objects or phenomena." 9 Over the
course of this thesis, we will try to understand how people recognize this object of
carbon, speak about it and assign meaning to it while at the same time treat it as a stable
entity which can be positively acted upon by the administrative capacities of the state.
This approach, which Jasanoff calls "co-productionist" will help us gain a "sense of the
untidy, uneven processes through which the production of science and technology
becomes entangled with social norms and hierarchies... [and] allow us to evaluate how
sociotechnical formations loop back to change the very terms in which we human beings
think about ourselves and our positions in the world. " By looking at carbon as an
outcome of social definitions, instead of a preexisting entity available for manipulation,
we will gain purchase on how the language and administrative technologies which frame
and convert forests into carbon are part of a politics of climate change that are actively
reformatting the powers of the State and concurrently stabilizing the ontology of carbon.
In addition to the vocabulary of co-production, we will look at how carbon management
constitutes a domain of state building that relies on the legitimacy of green techniques,
7 See Marthe Bosuandole interview with Jose Endundo in Documentation et Information pour /'Afrique,
October 17, 2011. http://www.dia-afrique.org/index.php?option=com-content&view-article&id=773:le-
ministre-jose-endundo--l-la-rdc-est-en-matiere-de-reduction-des-emissions-de-gaz-a-effet-de-serre-un-
pays-decisif-r&catid=38:economie-et-developpement&Itemid=30
8 Lynch, Michael, "The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson 'Dream Team' and the
Sociology of Knowledge Machine", Social Studies ofScience, 1998 Vol. 28 No. 5-6, p82 9 .
9 Jasanoff, Sheila, "The Idiom of Co-production," in States ofKnowledge: The Co-production ofScience
and Social Order (London: Routledge, 2004), p5 .
'O Ibid, p2.
8such as the institutionalization of social and environmental impact assessments,
investment in monitoring, reporting and verification systems and land use reforms, to
reconstruct the post-colonial state in the model of rational and responsibly governed
Western nation-states. This second theme, while highly related to co-production, expands
on studies of scholars of international relations and political sociology who see the
diffusion of policy norms, such as carbon management, as the work of "expert epistemic
communities and international organizations who define economic progress and human
rights," facilitating the uptake and dominance of certain styles of governance across
radically different policy settings."'
The Post-Conflict State and Carbon Development
Global climate change is an incontrovertible fact and poses a serious threat to subsistence
populations living in Sub-Saharan Africa. Projections of extreme weather events, more
frequent droughts and disruptions in local crop cycles bode particularly bad for people
with little means for sustained adaptation. Coupling climate mitigation with rural
development is seen by many to be a unified approach to a two-pronged problem:
alleviating poverty will reduce vulnerability to environmental change. But after years of
civil and regional war, the Congolese state, to the extent that it exists, is poorly equipped
to absorb the flush of forest carbon capital being offered by the developed world to
developing countries such as Brazil and Indonesia for reducing their deforestation rates.
Nor is the DRC at the moment capable of linking carbon payments, what are called
"performance-based payments", to improved forest management practices or better
livelihood outcomes for Congolese communities-what many see as necessities to make
REDD work. To address these gaps, the Bank and UN are deploying a tested toolkit of
capacity building and good government tactics that align state institutions with the
broader agenda of the emerging international "carbon-development" discourse.
The original effectiveness of REDD as a tool for mitigating climate change was premised on
the economic notion of achieving least cost in a broader regulated carbon market. From a
development perspective, REDD constitutes an opportunity to bring communities on the
margins of the global economy into contact with capital that will reward them for providing a
global public good-an intact rainforest system that helps stabilize atmospheric greenhouse
gas levels. Despite current deep uncertainties about the sources of financing for REDD
(whether from the private market through tradable offsets, or through bi-lateral public grants),
there is a more fundamental problem: REDD poses a significant challenge for economists
interested in assigning value to standing forests, which may have multiple competing
"values." In the DRC, current drivers of deforestation are connected to subsistence activities,
use values as opposed to exchange values, and this is particularly challenging for economists.
For instance, it is difficult to measure what economists call a villager's "opportunity costs" for
not clearing forests for new crop lands because it is difficult to know what value villagers are
being asked to forgo in exchange for altering their forest use. Much of the wealth a
subsistence farmer derives from the forest is not captured by pricing mechanisms in the
formal market. Thus forest uses in countries such as the DRC are not easily reducible to
calculations of market value. Separately from the economic challenge of incentive setting,
" Dobbin, Frank et al, "The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion,
Competition, or Learning?", Annual Review ofSociology 2007. 33:449-72, p450.
9Karsenty and Ongolo have criticized how the corrosion of formal institutions in the DRC (i.e.
wide-spread corruption and capture of state functions by self-serving cliques of "strongmen")
make it equally difficult to assess how or to whom compensation should be distributed to
achieve outcomes desired by proponents of REDD.' 2 Underestimating the market and
institutional obstacles in specific country contexts has lead, in the past, to overoptimistic
reports of the global affordability of REDD+ compared to other greenhouse gas emission
reduction options.' 3
Regardless of economic and institutional uncertainties (let alone technical, which we will
discuss later), a broad coalition of donor and tropical forest countries have coalesced
around a global agenda to make REDD a core plank of international climate mitigation
and development goals. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, this agenda is catalyzing a
number of experimental engagements between the Congolese state, the World Bank and
the United Nations, as well as more peripheral non-profit players, to build the
foundations for a national administrative system capable of governing carbon across the
country's vast, forested expanses. 14 The cornerstones of this administrative system,
explored in this thesis, include a national planning unit inside the Ministry of
Environment, Conservation of Nature and Tourism (MECNT) working in partnership
with the United Nations REDD Program, called the National REDD Coordination, and a
financing framework called the Forest Investment Program supported by the World Bank.
By following the activities and discourse of the planners, their critics and their
collaborators, we focus our interest in what sociologist Howard Becker calls "change
rather than stability, in ideas of process rather than structure." If we can get "some idea of
the interaction between social definitions [of forest use] and physical properties [of
forests]... we can see that the constraints we thought ineluctably built into the physical
object have a social and definitional component. Even better, we can watch objects
change character as their social definition changes."' 5 We have many historical accounts
of how commodities become "naturalized" across widely contingent and varying
circumstances (Minz, 1986 on sugar and tea; Cronon, 1991 on wheat, meat and timber;
Kurlansky 1998 on cod and 2003 on salt; and more recently Chapman, 2007 on bananas)
and looking at efforts to "naturalize" carbon in the Congo give us a window into the
phenomenon as it is unfolding in a uniquely fragile administrative setting.
The interactions between the Bank and the UN in the Democratic Republic of Congo are
1 See Alain Karsenty and Symphorien Ongolo "Can 'fragile states' decide to reduce their deforestation?
The inappropriate use of the theory of incentives with respect to the REDD mechanism" Forest Policy and
Economics, 2011.
13 See for instance Nicholas Stem, "Stem Review of the Economics of Climate Change," HM Treasury of
the UK Government, 2006, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sternreview index.htm or Richard Newell and
Robert Stavins, "Climate Change and Forest Sinks: Factors Affecting the Costs of Carbon Sequestration,"
Journal ofEnvironmental Ecological Management, Volume 40, Issue 3, November 2000, Pages 211-235.
14 As further proof of REDD's quick fusion with development agendas, it has been fully incorporated into
the DRC's "Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2012-2015" approved by the International Monetary Fund.
1 Becker, Howard S. Tricks of the Trade, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p4 6 -4 7 . Becker
continues on in this passage: "We can see that the object is, as I said above, the embodiment in physical
form of all the actions everyone took to bring it into being." This "bringing into being" is very much what I
want to keep alive in my analysis of forest carbon.
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also interesting because unlike many other forest countries that are also developing
REDD management systems (such as Brazil, Mexico and Indonesia), the institutional
capacity is so limited in the DRC that the staff of the UN and Bank are much more
directly involved in designing the national carbon policies. As a result, their perspectives
on how carbon might be made governable are more evident in the shape of Congolese
carbon management instruments, thus the link between carbon-finance discourse and its
tools of management are more visible to the analyst.
There is a strong normative argument by the framers of the international carbon finance
that by reducing forests to the metric of carbon, donors will have for the first time a
relatively simple means to gauge whether their money is making a difference (are more
trees being saved or not; as well as is village life improving). In the words of Andrew
Steer, the World Bank's Special Envoy for Climate Change "Performance-based
payments are the game changer in efforts to reduce tropical deforestation and forest
degradation." 6 We will attempt to make sense of how the intersection of biophysical,
economic and social metrics that forest carbon finance conjures are changing
perspectives of how development should happen and how forests should be seen in order
to be protected.
Field Methods and Presentation
I spent a total of 3 months in the Congo conducting fieldwork related to this thesis. I
spent six weeks in the most forested province of the country, Equateur; and six weeks in
Kinshasa, the capital of the DRC. In Equateur, I collaborated with a U.S.-based science
organization called the Woods Hole Research Center and conducted socio-economic
baseline studies for them in a number of forest communities where they are planning to
implement a REDD+ pilot project linked to the government's national REDD+ strategy.
The goal of the research with Woods Hole was to better understand local issues of forest
and land use and identify moments and incidents for when villagers mobilized for the
purpose of collective action. The results of this community-level research on informal
local institutions and land use practices infuses this thesis with a richer understanding of
how villagers sustain themselves in the absence of functioning state services or accessible
markets, and hopefully gives my writing a deeper appreciation for differences in how
villages live with and make sense of the forest in the absence of an idea like carbon.
Subsequently, I was embedded in Kinshasa in the Ministry of Environment for 6 weeks
with the group responsible for designing and implementing the national REDD+ policies
and administrative architecture-the Coordination National-REDD. Through semi-
structured interviews and participant observation, I immersed myself in the day-to-day
production and conversation surrounding the national REDD+ instruments in order to
gain a sense of how these Congolese and expatriate actors understand the meaning of
their own actions. This material forms the core of my study. Here, my research followed
a "co-productionist" inquiry, where to understand how social entities such as the "state"
or natural entities such as "carbon" function in the world, "one has to ask how diverse
16 Andrew Steers, the World Bank's Special Envoy for Climate, quoted in a Press Release from the
Norwegian Royal Ministry of Environment at the announcement of Norway's commitment of $50 million
to the Carbon Fund of the FCPF, 06/21/2011.
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actors use and understand the concept, how it is articulated through formal and informal
practices, where and by whom it is contested, and how it reasserts itself in the face of
challenges to its integrity and meaning."' 7
One thing that can be said is that for all of these actors in the National Coordination, the
idea that carbon already exits out there is taken for granted. It is the contention of this
thesis that only through the specific institutional and cultural activities of the CN-REDD
might carbon become an entity with any social significance in the DRC. To put it another
way, carbon might be said to exist only if it is linked to the institutional forms that would
govern it. The thrust of the argument is to understand how, in the situated office of
Kinshasa, where bureaucrats from the Congolese Ministry of Environment, and
technocrats from the United Nations Development Program and the World Bank are
working to make carbon governable, we see the contours of the carbon as an artifact of
forest governance and the post-colonial state as a terrain of international climate politics.
The transformations of the Congolese state and its development by outside forces can
only be understood as the inclusion of its peripheries into global markets which
themselves are responsible for structuring the very object they are designed to circulate.
This thesis proceeds in five main chapters. The first chapter sketches the salient features
of the current Congolese State, as well as its relation to forests and forest communities.
The second chapter, in order to set the context for the role of the UN and the World Bank
in the REDD+ Preparedness Planning (R-PP), which the DRC was actively involved
while I was doing my field-work, provides a thorough history of their involvement in
shaping the broader politics of carbon finance and development. The third chapter frames
the empirical material I gathered during my ethnography of the Coordination National-
REDD and analyzes the CN-REDD itself as a nexus of institutional action and boundary
crossing that both masks and helps stabilize slippages between the international
institutions and the domestic object of their carbon ministrations - the Congolese state.
The fourth chapter is an exposition of one of the Bank's major carbon finance tools, the
Forest Investment Program (FIP), and the Congolese investment plan for this program
which was in the final stages of design and articulation while I was in the country. This is
a detailed plan for how the Congo will manage roughly $100 million of carbon finance to
reduce emissions from its forest sector. We will look closely at how the FIP framing of
"performance-based" payments links carbon to accountability metrics for development
aid.
Finally, the conclusion will assess how this rise of carbon finance fits into a greening of
state-building in which the Bank has played a key role in both preparing third world
countries to be purveyors of "green" investments and sustainable development, but also
how the ontology of forests, and the communities that depend on them, are at an unusual
intersection of international attention on climate change, poverty and resource politics.
The DRC is ground zero in Africa of a deepening struggle between older-colonial
hegemonies and the influence of rising economies such as China and India interested in
Congolese resources. This larger shift in power poses a challenge to the notion that
17 Jasanoff, Sheila, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p19 .
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sophisticated global pollution markets can actually address the twin problems of a
destabilized global climate and the political dispossession of citizens of the third world
by their own states.
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Chapter One
The State and the Forest
Congo: A Sovereign Territory without a State
At the bottom of the UN Human Development Index (187 out of 187)18, counted as one
of the worst places in the world to do business (Transparency International ranks the
DRC 168th out of 183 countries) 19, it might seem like the Democratic Republic of Congo
has more critical issues to tackle before launching investments in nascent forest carbon
schemes. The country recently went through its second-ever presidential elections in
November 2011 and, with the reelection of Joseph Kabila, narrowly avoided slipping
back into the wide-scale domestic violence that ended more or less in 2003.20 Kabila's
main opponent in the elections, veteran Congolese politician Etienne Tshisekedi, was still
refusing to recognize the legitimacy of Kabila's reelection, but so far, as of the writing of
this thesis, there has been no forceful resistance. Yet, lingering resentments exist from
many quarters over Kabila's consolidation of power following the end of the war. Days
before I arrived in Kinshasa in March 2011, there was an assassination attempt on Kabila
at his presidential palace. The attackers, a "ramschackle group of soldiers, many armed
only with machetes" were quickly repulsed by the President's Republican Guard, but the
origins and motives for the attack remain mired in the opaque labyrinth of Congolese
politics.21 The Christian Science Monitor ran an article with the headline "Was there a
coup attempt in the DRC this weekend?" and surmised that even if there was not (the
assassins' affiliation and motives remain unknown), the attack highlighted the incredible
fragility of the state and its leader's grasp on authority. So what is this state and how did
it emerge?
To understand the Democratic Republic of Congo, we have to return briefly to its former
incarnation, the Zaire. The Oxford English Dictionary definition of "kleptocracy" - "A
ruling body or order of thieves. Also, government by thieves; a nation ruled by this kind
of government"-fits Zaire like the spots fit the leopard. 22 Mobutu Sese Seko, the
founder and long running dictator of Zaire, sat at the head of this "government" for over
thirty years, exerting an increasingly paranoid grip on the wealth of the country and using
its distribution as a means of maintaining his control over the state while at the same time
'8 See International Human Development Indicators (HDI) from the United Nations Development Program,
2011. http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COD.html; the HDI is based on three metrics:
education, health and income.
19 See Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2011.
20 This year was the country's first nation-wide legislative elections; there were 19,000 registered
legislative candidates for 500 Parliamentary seats. The proliferation of parties at the regional level is on the
one hand an admirable marker of a country eager for democracy as well as an indicator of the extreme
dissimilarity between the current Congolese state and Weber's ideal type. There is minimal consolidation
of local interest groups into representative bodies that can contend with the already entrenched national
elites. In Kinshasa alone there were 5,351 candidates running for 51 seats.
Jason Stearns, "Was there a coup attempt in the DRC this weekend?" Christian Science Monitor, March
1, 2011; http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/Africa-Monitor/2011/030 1/Was-there-a-coup-attempt-in-
the-DRC-this-weekend
2 See OED Online. "kleptocracy, n.", December 2011. Oxford University Press. 17 January 2012
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/l 03832'?rskey-yvl lQN&result=2&isAdvanced=false>.
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"running state institutions into the ground."23 Development theorist Peter Evans refers to
this kind of government as a "predatory state"; a state that "extract[s] such large amounts
of otherwise investable surplus and provide[s] so little in the way of 'collective goods' in
return that [it] impede[s] economic transformation." Indeed, he goes on to write, "Zaire
might be considered an archetypal case of such a state." 24 The great unraveling of the
Zairian state happened over the bloody course of seven years. It's first phase began in
1996 when a regional coalition of neighboring countries led by Angola, Uganda and
Rwanda launched coordinated attacks to topple the Mobutu regime because of Zaire's
role in protecting Hutu militias along the Rwandan border. The conflict's second phase
ended in 2003, with the signing of a peace treaty that reunited (at least superficially)
internal, warring factions of Congolese strongmen under the new banner of the
Democratic Republic of Congo.
The DRC was the name given to Zaire by Laurent Desire Kabila, the Congolese
opposition leader who eventually took Kinshasa from Mobutu (along with significant aid
from the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the Angolan and Ugandan militaries). Kabila was
assassinated in 2001, and his son Joseph was appointed to lead the new state toward its
first presidential elections, a process that was interrupted for two and a half years of
renewed fighting primarily with Kabila's main rival, Jean-Pierre Bemba and his
Mouvement pour le Liberation du Congo (MLC) party, as well as a host of lesser regional
warlords. These two periods of conflict, in which a staggering 5 million people died, are
called the First and Second Congo Wars. Despite the peace accords of 2003, fighting
continues in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu, and according to Congo
observer Jason Stearns, "can be considered as the third episode of the war." 25
Following Max Weber's common definition of the State as "a human community that
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given
territory," we would have to conclude that the DRC lays tenuous claim to statehood.26
National unity achieved in the early days of Mobutu was an impressive feat, given that
the former -territory controlled by the Belgian Congo covers a space roughly the size of
Western Europe. Within this vast landscape, there are hundreds of different ethnic groups
with little tying them to each other beyond the dubious distinction of being once under
the thumb of their Belgian colonizers. Mahmood Mamdani, writing at the end of the first
Congolese War in 1999 described the Congolese state not as a monopoly of power, but as
a loose federation of ethnic authorities once collectively recognized as Native Authorities
under Belgian rule. "What holds the Congo together is not as much the civic power in
Kinshasa and Kisangani and so on, but the hundreds of Native Authorities that control the
bulk of the population in the name of enforcing 'custom.'" 2 7 The origin of these Native
Authorities was part of the Belgian's need to legitimize their power at the local level. So
23 Stearns, Jason, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of
Africa, (New York City: Public Affairs, 2011), p7 .
2 Evans, Peter B. "Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy
Perspective on the Third World State", Sociological Forum, Vol. 4, No. 4 1989, p5 6 2 .
25 Stearns, 2011, p8 .2 6 Weber, Max. "Politics as a Vocation", From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H.H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills, (London: Routledge, 1998), p7 7 .
27 Mamdani, Mahmood, "Preliminary Thoughts on the Congo Crisis, Social Text, No. 60 1999, p54.
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the "collapse of the African state" according to Mamdani, cannot be understood through
the typical lens of globalization "whose post-Fordist waves are said to be dissolving the
nation-state."28 It needs to be seen as an effect of the colonial legacy that initially
separated local customary power from centralized civic power, effectively crippling the
state of Zaire from its birth. This "bifurcated nature of the African state" lingers today
and has a significant impact on access to resources such as the forest.
In most regards, the current Congo is also lacking anything resembling an "imagined
community", what Benedict Anderson considered a requisite for creating the modem
nation-state.29 Independence in 1960 forged a brief project of "nation-building",
spearheaded by the energetic education and military policies of Mobutu, but this was
already unraveling and available to be documented by the time that V.S. Naipaul writes a
Bend in the River, in 1989. French is the official language of the DRC, but there are four
main tribal languages that divide the country geographically and politically.3 0 Lingala
has long been the language of the capital, Kinshasa, and was Mobutu's native tongue, but
the new rulers come from the far Eastern province of Katanga, where Swahili is spoken,
and often more English than French. Joseph Kabila's Lingala is known to be poor, as was
his French when he took power and this has created tensions at the top of the state, where
an influx of Swahili speaking functionaries in the ministries and the military create
communication breakdowns with former Mobutu-era bureaucrats.
Fractured politics stemming from regional differences in language are further cemented
in the Congo by strong regional differences in resource endowment. The DRC is
generally seen as one of the most resource rich countries in the world, with massive
reserves of copper, gold, tin, coltan and diamonds, huge hydroelectric potential, vast
tracts of cultivable land and miles upon miles of tropical forest. But these resources are
often localized in areas under the control of one or more of the larger tribal groups, and
over the course of the country's history, these endowments have gone to line the pockets
of political elite in Kinshasa as well as a few strongmen from the region, with minimal
reinvestment in the country itself.
There are slight signs that Kabila is encouraging renewed investments in resource
extraction, opening the doors of state resources to foreign companies. The opening of the
Twangiza gold mine this October in South Kivu, for instance, is the first new industrial
gold mine to be opened in the Congo in 50 years and is run by a joint Canadian-American
firm.3 1 But there have been some spectacular seizures of property as well that have rattled
investment by Western companies, such as the revocation of the copper contract held by
First Mineral, a $430 million asset. In any case, to the extent that Kabila is encouraging
and these investments, he is trying to walk a thin line between following the conditions of
international donors, to which the State it beholden for half of its budget, and the
28 Ibid, p55.
2 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism,
(London: Verso, 2006).
30 The principal languages spoken in the DRC are: Lingala, Ki-Congo, Tshiluba, Swahili..
3 See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Democratic Republic of Congo, December 2011.
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consolidation of his own network of wealth and authority.32 Western donors and their
"conditions" are quickly losing place to the Chinese, whose resource contracts topped
World Bank donor aid for the first time in 2010, making them the biggest benefactors of
the Congolese State.
Once Kabila arrived in power, he almost immediately sacked the entire cabinet of his
father and "appointed a new group of technocrats, young Congolese who had not been as
tainted by corruption and warmongering. The new finance minister came from the
International Monetary Fund, the new information minister was a U.S.-educated
journalist."33 This turnover of political elite within the apparatuses of the state introduces
new, but not necessarily different blood into the system. International partners are
beginning to doubt reform. The International Monetary Fund is providing the
government with extended credit (country debt is a roughly 1:1 ratio of GDP) for which it
expects the DRC to maintain tight fiscal and monetary policy, as well initiate more broad
based structural reforms. "Yet, the personal interests of the presidential clan have become
increasingly at odds with this reform programme, particularly regarding increased
transparency in natural resource deals. This contradiction will manifest itself in many
ways, such as the manner in which upcoming oil blocks are auctioned and state mining
assets sold and re-sold. The country's reputation as an investment destination, which was
never strong, is being weakened by this."34
Steams notes in his book Dancing in the Glory ofMonsters, "Reforming the [Congolese]
state will require tackling entrenched interests and mafia-like networks that permeate the
administration. In doing so, [Kabila] risks offending powerful people, who could then try
to unseat him."35 As if echoing that point, the assassination attempt mentioned above was
preceded by an earlier attempted coup in 2004. "President Kabila," Stearns continues "is
intent on centralizing power to the detriment of an efficient state bureaucracy and the rule
of law. In 2009, the suggested that he wanted to change the constitution to prevent
decentralization, extend term limits, and bring the judiciary further under his control. His
government has expropriated several lucrative oil and mining concessions from
multinational corporations, allegedly in order to distribute them to companies close to
him." 36
So, we are still largely dealing with the kleptocratic, predatory state of the Mobutu era,
where the political elite is involved in the apparatuses of the state largely to continue
extracting wealth by controlling state owned resources. The Congolese state, in effect,
might also call a "stateless sovereign", a territory that is recognized by all surrounding
states as sovereign but over which there is no effective state ruling; and yet by the fact
32 According to Jason Steams analysis of the Congolese Budget, state budget expenditures for 2010 were
$2.1 billion, about 48% of the budget. The bulk of this came from China ($980 million) and the World
Bank ($927 million). In addition to about $650 million in humanitarian aid and $1.4 billion, donor giving
for DRC in 2010 hovers around $4 billion; see Congo Siasa; http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2009/1 0/how-
much-is-congo-getting.html
3 Steams, 2011, p3 1 9 .
3 Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011, p10.
3 Steams, 2011, p 32 4 .
36 Ibid, p325.
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that no other state controls the land, it becomes necessary for surrounding states to create
the structures of modem bureaucracy in order to realize their own agendas. This is the
tension of the Congo; there are individuals with power and authority not interested in
developing institutions that might deprive them of their power; there are government
interests in Rwanda and Uganda interested in keeping the eastern parts of the country
destabilized so that they can continue to steal Congolese resources; but at the same time,
there is a cost to adjacent countries of a weak DRC across whose borders rebel groups
hide with impunity, threatening the integrity of Ugandan and Rwandan communities. I
want to avoid painting too rosy picture, but I also want to suggest why there may be
reasons to be encouraged by the introduction of REDD into this Machiavellian nest of
resource politics. To produce carbon in the DRC requires the social engagement of forest
communities-through their agricultural practices, through their fuel choices and cooking
technologies. Attention to these aspects of rural life and investment in alternatives could
have real benefits for those people who are left out, or worse harmed, by economies of
resource extraction, as long as they are appropriately structured.
REDD and the Politics of Forests Use
Forests, and the land under them, are perhaps the principal natural resource for most
Congolese. Besides the 21 million Congolese whose livelihoods depend directly on
forests, 90% of the country's energy supply is from fuel wood and charcoal, so even for
the nearly 9 million Congolese who live in Kinshasa, or the roughly 6 million in other
major cities, brewing a morning cup of tea or boiling their nightly manioc links them
directly back to the forests. Mining may account for nearly 75% of country exports in
2008, but agriculture and forestry accounted for 40.2% of gross domestic product, by far
the largest domestic sector of the economy (mining was 28% of GDP)." This figure,
which does not take into account informal artisanal logging, subsistence crop production
or the harvest of non-timber forest products for local consumption, indicates how
disconnected local populations are from the wealth generated from extractive industries
and how, the forests feed the material survival of most Congolese.
Like most sub-Saharan African countries, the state legally owns all the forests of the
country.38 The sovereign rights to the forests were reasserted in the 2002 Forest Code, a
major reform to Congolese land laws financed by the World Bank whose implementation
is being overseen by the Ministry of Environment, Conservation of Nature and Tourism
(MECNT). In the Congo, as in much of Central Africa, the reform in the forestry sector
predates the carbon craze.
Joseph Ipalaka, a parliamentarian from Bikoro and former Secretary General of the
Ministry of Environment, was one of the main initiators of the 2002 Forestry Code in the
DRC, which was formalized in a moment of extreme juridical fragility. "The entire
reform.. .was developed in a moment when there was no strong unity in the country nor
was there any deep structural cooperation at the level of the state. We had to do all sorts
of gymnastics, use personal relations...it was with Laurent from the World Bank, who I
37 Economist Intelligence Unit, 2011, p6 .
38DRC Forest Code, Law 011/2002, 08/29/2002.
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met in Cameroon, who was implementing forestry reform in Cameroon; I asked him how
we could start in the DRC and even without political unity, we still pushed through this
massive refonn of the forestry sector. 39
This wide ranging set of reforms has already framed much of the maneuvering room of
the subsequent carbon initiatives, but simultaneously, the attention on carbon has also
given leverage to unfinished aspects of this reform package, particularly elements of the
reform dealing with land tenure and local communities. In many respects, the regulatory
approach taken to making REDD+ a reality must grapple with a number of problems
related to forest governance in general:
Even if the state "owns" the forests, they exist largely outside the control of the central
state, despite efforts to bring them under heal. There are three provinces in the country,
Bandundu, Equateur and Orientale that contain over 80% of the country's forestland, but
the regulated sector itself is miniscule compared to its potential. As a result, there is an
extensive informal and illegal forest sector both for domestic and export markets that
dwarfs the official state managed export market. Receipts from formal timber revenue for
2007, for instance, were based on 500,000 m3 of registered timber, whereas estimates of
the illegal export market are upward of 600,000 m3 and the informal domestic market
ranges in studies of anywhere from 1.5 million m3 to 2.5 million m3. 0 This presents
significant problems as far as implementing a REDD+ regime, which requires careful
accounting of deforestation reference levels and controls for displacement of
deforestation from one jurisdiction to another (called leakage in REDD+ lingo).
The majority of people living in the three forest provinces (~25 million) live intimately
with the forest in small to medium size communities where subsistence level farming is a
way of survival. The forest is the only major safety net these people have upon which to
fall back; this explains partly why studies on the drivers and determinants of
deforestation in the DRC focus on land clearing for farming and the production of
charcoal or fuel wood for cooking.
Another challenge to initiatives aimed at reducing deforestation describes is the
dependency of the Congolese on wood for energy: 90% of the country is reliant on
biomass in some form or another with which to cook. This is slightly less in the city, but
still well over 80%. The roads connecting main villages, such as the route from
Mbandaka to Bikoro hang heavy with the smoke of cook fires; even in Kinshasa,
directors of divisions I spoke with from the Ministry of Environment must give
themselves 30 minutes in the morning to start their fires in their urban homes in order to
have a hot cup of tea before work. The demand for fuel wood in urban areas has a
dramatic effect on the forest periphery and any parts of the forest that can be easily
transported by water to the city often end up providing fuel supply (the Congo river is a
major conduit for what the Congolese call "makala" or charcoal).
39 Interview CC-026 with Joseph Ipalaka, 5/17/11.
40 See Debroux, L et al "Forests in Post-Conflict Democratic Republic of Congo: Analysis of a Priority
Agenda." CIFOR, the World Bank and CIRAD, 2007.
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Farming consists largely of smallholders practicing swidden agriculture, which provides
complex links between communities and the physical world and deeply integrates social
routines and cultural traditions with degraded forest structures. Still, productivity of
farmlands often suffer over time and farmers are constantly required to uncover new
lands by clearing primary forest, which matched with high birth rates, has other impacts
on village livelihoods by reducing availability of habitat for bush meat and disrupting the
harvest of other non-timber forest products; In addition, regional bush meat markets and
consistent urban demand for bush meat has depleted many forest areas of resources used
by locals.
In relation to timber policies, the Forest Code of 2002 4 introduced a review and
rationalization of all existing forest concession contracts. This had a drastic impact on the
speculative holding and trading of vast parcels of forestland for development. 26
enterprises now hold 80 concessions totaling 12 million hectares compared to 25 million
hectares prior to the review and 40 million hectares in 2001; during the 15 years of
conflict. There is an ongoing moratorium on new timber concessions.
Artisanal logging is seen as the largest source of timber-related deforestation, largely for
domestic and regional markets. Up to 2 million metric-cube; illegal logging takes another
huge amount of timber and sends it through resource mafias on the border of Rwanda and
Uganda; the forests of Ituri, when seen from space are being eaten from the northeast. My
own travels in the Goma area, driving the winding highland roads into the Virunga
volcano lands were punctuated with the frequent transport truck traveling from the Kivu
basin carrying cut wood boards across the Rwanda border at Gisenyi.
Non-timber Forest Product harvesting is a key type of resource use for local
communities. Not much revenue at all generated from these activities, but the state would
like to start taxing even smaller portions of forest-related receipts, by taxing for instance
marattaci fronds (a "Non-timber forest product") which villagers sell in markets and
which are taxed in Cameroon.
Land tenure and forest rights continue to be key motivators of politics at the local level.
4 Forest Code 2002: "new forest laws and after the World Bank imposed a moratorium on new concessions
in 2002, in return for $90m of development aid." And writing about the old cahiers de charge (actually the
Protocol d'accord) still operating in 2007: "The system of concessionaries offering gifts to communities in
return for permission to log is now the basis of the whole forestry operation in Congo. Research by Ngongo
and Ocean shows that isolated communities, which have seldom had contact with outsiders, are being
persuaded to sign away, for just a few machetes and bags of salt, the rights to the forests on which they
have depended for millions of years. One company gave a community 18 bars of soap, four packets of
soup, 24 bottles of beer and two bags of sugar. Another signed a deal for 20 sacks of sugar, 200 bags of
salt, 200 machetes and 200 spades. In Orientale province, another company promised a school, a clinic and
enough wood to provide for their coffins. "It is happening everywhere," Ngongo says. "Concessions are
being given out, and the villagers are not being told what the chiefs are signing up to. Communities are in
chaos and there is more and more social conflict. It is a cruel system that continues the injustices and
atrocities of the colonial system but it is even worse because it deprives communities of their resources and
consigns them to perpetual poverty." The concessionary system is so far found only in Africa - in
francophone Africa, in fact - but it may yet spread to the great forest areas of, say, South America."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/sep/22/congo.environment
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The state is decentralizing and struggling to change its juridical relationship to local
communities. The Forest Code of 2002 reasserted that all forests are the inalienable
property of the state, but the code classified forests as falling into 3 categories: 1)
reservedforests (ICCN), 2) permanent production forests (available for industrial
production), 3) protectedforests (default category to customary management. Like most
African states, despite civic authority over the forests, there is a rich and thriving concept
of customary rights to the forest and land. Communities that live next the land are the
rightful users of the land, and if some other user (a timber concession, a mining company,
or some migrant ethnic group) wants access to the lands, they theoretically need to
negotiate and trade against the existing community's customary rights. In practice, this
results in intense and sometimes violent asymmetries of power between local
communities and concessionaires who obtain titles to community land through the
Ministries of Mining, Agriculture, Environment, and/or Hydrocarbon. Compensation
clauses are frequently not respected, and there is little recourse for a community that
doesn't have any legal standing to their lands beyond traditional claims.
It should be no surprise that current drivers of deforestation in the Democratic Republic
of Congo are preponderantly linked to local land use practices, particularly subsistence
agriculture, artisanal logging and charcoal production for local and regional
consumption.42 As a result, the country currently experiences low rates of deforestation
and has high remaining forest cover compared to other tropical forest countries.
However, with newfound political stability, this context is likely to rapidly change as the
government and donors focus increasingly on food security and natural resource driven
economic growth. Nonetheless, for the short to medium-term, this means that efforts
aimed at changing deforestation rates in the DRC must include engaging with local
communities to help them procure food and energy in ways that have less impact on
forest cover. Years of conflict and the collapse of state investment in the agricultural
sector has reduced extension systems for rural development to fractions of former
capacity. 43 Rural communities, which constitute 70% of the population, have largely been
left to themselves and muddle along as best they can in the absence of a functional
government.44
This is where REDD proposes to intervene, not just as mechanism that links tropical
forests and forest populations to carbon finance as a means of slowing rapid trends in
tropical deforestation, but as a means of "state building" in parts of the country where the
state has entirely disappeared. The lead UN technical advisor within the Ministry of
Environment unit, the National REDD Coordination puts it like this: "In my opinion,
REDD needs to shape tools that support the project of sovereignty, that reinforce the
national sovereignty [of the DRC], and in my opinion that is really the strategic
importance of REDD in the DRC."45 We could not have a more clear description of the
greening of state building.
42 See de Wasseige, 2009.
43 See Catherine Ragasa, "Institutional and Capacity Challenges in Agricultural Policy Process: The Case
of the Democratic Republic of Congo," IFPRI Discussion Paper 01066, 2011.
44 See Debroux, 2007.
41 Interview CC-022 with Fabian Monteils, 5/12/11.
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The administrative system of forest management being developed by the UN and World
Bank to achieve this "reinforcement" borrows a great deal from the knowledge practices
of the Bank and the UN over the past twenty years in targeting "environmentally
sustainable development." Goldman calls this the "fragile hegemony" of green neo-
liberalism. 46 But unlike previous frameworks for development, the financing for these
activities does not rely solely on overseas development aid, but comes from the idea that
carbon should carry a price, and its sequestration in trees, should generate development
revenue that will help tropical forest countries slow the conversion of forest lands into
other economic uses that reduce forest cover. This development paradigm, as described
within the REDD framework of the UNFCCC negotiations, operates through a "results-
based" or "performance-based" payment system and its novelty is heralded by many in
the carbon finance world.47 Before turning to the empirical chapters on carbon
management within the DRC, we will next trace the origins of the carbon-development
discourse and practice as embodied in the work of the World Bank and the United
Nations REDD Programme.
46 Goldman, Michael, Imperial Nature: The World Bank and Struggles for Social Justice in the Age of
Globalization, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005).
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Chapter two
Carbon-Development as Discourse and Practice
From Avoided Deforestation to REDD+
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), created at
the 1992 Earth Summit, in Rio, is the primary policy venue steering the international
response to human-caused climate change. Despite the clear significance of forest
conversion on both global and regional climates, incorporating forests into the official
UNFCCC negotiations on carbon emission reductions has proven difficult until relatively
recently.
Before REDD+ became the concept of the day, the idea of reducing global emissions by
reducing the conversion of forestland was known as "avoided deforestation." It was part
of a triad of forest related GHG sequestration and mitigation approaches (reforestation,
afforestation and avoided deforestation) covered in international negotiations as Land
Use, Land Use Change and Forests (LULUCF). Both reforestation and afforestation were
included as official offset activities in the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint
Implementation markets of the Kyoto Protocol, but avoided deforestation was kept off
the table by an alliance of skeptical tropical forest countries and international
environmental NGOs. Their main complaints focused on two concerns: that by
commoditizing forest carbon, an avoided deforestation offset mechanism threatened the
territorial sovereignty of countries such as Brazil (who feared rampant land speculation in
the Amazon by carbon investors); and that benefits from avoided deforestation
investments were too difficult to measure, easy to game, and would allow developed
countries to defer making costly industrial emissions reductions at home.
After successfully blocking "avoided deforestation" at Kyoto, this political alliance more
or less dissolved. This created space for a new, pro-avoided deforestation lobby to form
within the UNFCCC process a few years later and reinitiate negotiations on avoided
deforestation, now reformulated as reducing emissions from deforestation (RED). At the
same time, some of the original critics have become if not ardent promoters, or at least
cautious supporters, of REDD+. The Brazilian states of Acre and Amazonia, for instance,
are actively negotiating with the state of California for the creation of a carbon-offset
protocol linking reductions in Brazilian deforestation to corporate emission management
obligations under the emerging California cap-and-trade program. The World Wildlife
Fund, once an active opponent of avoided deforestation, is now implementing
experimental REDD+ projects in at least 15 different tropical forest countries.48
48 WWF was instrumental in keeping REDD off the agenda at Kyoto and thereby scuttling the chance that
"avoided deforestation" make it into the Clean Development Mechanism at Kyoto. At a meeting of
"Avoided Deforestation Partners" in Washington DC in 2008, WWF President Carter Roberts publicly
threw WWF's support behind REDD, which had been floated at COP 11 in Montreal and launched at
COP13 in Bali. The organization's rationale, according to Roberts: "We need forests to be in there, but
energy efficiency and movement to renewables are equally important," he said, adding that the basis for
climate change mitigation "must be absolute deep cuts in emissions in the U.S... If the cuts are real and
deep, that will force cuts across all sectors... [they] can't be superficial,..There is no silver bullet for
resolving the climate crisis. We need a broad effort that targets all sources of greenhouse gas emissions.
Tropical deforestation, which accounts for nearly a fifth of global emissions, obviously must be an integral
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Within this genealogy, the DRC is a relative latecomer to the forest carbon discussion.
While avoided deforestation was dying a strangled death at Kyoto in 1997, the DRC was
just being born, and the people of the Congo Basin were still gripped in the midst of a
devastating regional war. These parallel trajectories, the political evolution of Zaire to the
DRC and the conceptual repackaging of avoided deforestation as REDD+ could not seem
further from each other, but by the time the UN climate negotiations of Bali are underway
in 2007, they are mutually concerned.
So what accounts for the resurgent interest globally in forests as large sinks of carbon and
the belief that some of the carbon in the DRC is potentially subject to administration?
Some analysts have looked at the convergence of advances in remote sensing technology
that allow for rapid and repeat satellite visualizations of forest cover change and cheap
calculations of forest carbon, along with increased techniques of accounting that make it
possible to make different types of greenhouse gas commensurate to a "carbon
equivalent." 49 New technologies also meant more precise scientific estimates of
emissions caused by tropical deforestation, which seemed to be increasing at an alarming
rate in the Southeast Asian and Amazonian rainforests. It became largely accepted in
scientific and policy circles, for instance, that Indonesia was the third and Brazil the
fourth highest emitter of greenhouse gases after the United States and China. Despite the
modest size of their economies and related industrial emissions, they were larger
polluters than Germany, Japan or the U.K.
Along with these improved technical capacities and more precise scientific observations,
many developing country governments have become convinced that there is money to be
made in managing forest carbon in a way that does not threaten their sovereignty.50
Beginning in 2005, the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, an inter-governmental group of
43 tropical forest countries lead by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica (Brazil,
conspicuously, is not a member), lobbied the 2005 COP in Montreal to consider RED as
a mechanism for global emission reductions. The Coalition of Rainforest Nations
capitalized on the urgency of rapidly disappearing forests and created an ad hoc group
within the UNFCCC process to consider and make recommendations for appropriate
RED mechanisms.
Finally, there was a renewed moral concern from developed countries to take
responsibility in paying to stop the depletion of tropical forests, which were being
increasingly valued as a global public good whose protection developing countries could
ill afford. The tone of this concern is reminiscent of the moral language used over the last
few decades to galvanize Western interest to intervene in developing countries to protect
biodiversity.5 A brief illustration of this trend: in 2008 shortly after Bali, a large US-
based conservation organization, Conservation International, released a public service
part of a comprehensive climate change strategy." Rhett Butler, "WWF ends contentious debate, will now
support effort to fight climate change by saving rainforests", Mongabay.com, September 24,
2008http://news.mongabay.com/2008/0924-wwf.html.
49 See William Boyd, "Ways of Seeing in Environmental Law: How Deforestation Became an Object of
Climate Governance, Ecology Law Quarterly, 37/843, 2010.
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announcement starring one of their board members, Harrison Ford. In the short spot, Ford
walks into a beauticians' salon looking at the camera and describing how the slashing and
burning of tropical rainforest adds "carbon dioxide into the air we breathe; which changes
our climate." With a grim face he takes his shirt off and sits down in the beautician's
chair while she begins to rub hot wax on his exposed chest hair. Then, looking at the
camera while the beautician applies a waxing sheet, he says "Every bit of rainforest that
gets ripped out over there," he grits his teeth as the beautician rips away a sheet full of
chest hair, "really hurts us over here." Here, the man who escaped the Temple of Doom
and the evil clutches of Jaba the Hut, a cinematic figure of simultaneously colonial and
galactic proportions, personally embodies the pain of the vanishing world's forests on a
patch of skin about an inch and a half from his heart. The symbolism is not difficult to
decode: the white man's burden continues in the form of his emasculation via ecological
destruction-probably at the hands of Chinese palm oil companies. The reverse narrative
is laughably difficult to imagine: Harrison Ford, gritting his teeth, looking into the
camera and saying, "Every bit of cars we drive over here, hurts them over there."
In the space of these few years, from Montreal to Harrison Ford's wax job, actors at the
World Bank, the UN and to a lesser extent conservation groups such as CI, began the
substantive work that lead to the inclusion of REDD in the Bali Action Plan at the 13th
Conference of Parties (COP) in Indonesia. Through the Action Plan, the member
countries agreed to a framework that addressed for the first time the connection of
standing forests and climate change with "Policy approaches and positive incentives on
issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in
developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries."s 2 This agenda, which
promotes policy reforms and economic incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation (REDD), along with monetary rewards for increasing forest stock,
conservation and sustainable forest management in developing countries (+), is what is
conventionally known as REDD+.
Active work on formalizing REDD+ would proceed over the next few years through two
different organs within the UNFCCC, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical
Advice (SBTSA) and the ad hoc working group on long-term cooperative action (AWG-
LCA). But accompanying these official committees of negotiation for the Bali Action
Plan was the launch of a two World Bank managed funds-the Forest Carbon Partnership
Facility (FCPF) and the Strategic Climate Fund-and the creation of United Nations
REDD Programme (UN-REDD). These two institutions are the main drivers of technical
capacity in the Democratic Republic of Congo on forest carbon, as well as in the bulk of
other REDD+ countries. Understanding the structures of these institutions will help us
understand the possibilities and politics of action currently being taken in the DRC on
forest carbon. We will start with the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility,
since they were the first to begin a full definition and formulation of the problem of
managing forest carbon.
Forest Carbon Fiduciary: The World Bank's Offset Expertise
2 UNFCCC Bali Action Plan, paragraph 1b(iii), 2007.
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Following the Montreal Conference of Parties and the lobbying of the Coalition of
Rainforest Nations, the idea of scaling up investments in standing tropical forests sparked
new interest within the Bank. Ahead of the 2007 G8 Summit in Germany, the German
government helped organize two consultations, which included the participation of
developing and developed countries and NGOs, on the idea of a global forest carbon
fund. These meetings "culminated in encouragement, at the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm
in June 2007, for the World Bank to design a 'forest carbon partnership,"' which
eventually became the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) announced at Bali. 53
The FCPF is far from the first carbon fund founded by the Bank and it is in understanding
their broader approach to carbon finance that we will understand their approach to
managing forest carbon.
Since the finalization of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the Bank has sought to influence
climate change mitigation by "catalyz[ing] the market for carbon emissions reductions."54
In order to achieve this goal, the Bank has created a suite of funds dedicated to making
carbon offsets (called Certified Emission Reductions under the Clean Development
Mechanism) available for countries and companies regulated under Kyoto. Carbon
offsets as produced when an equivalent ton of greenhouse gas emissions are prevented
from being emitted into the atmosphere by coordinated activity. They represent a small
portion of the larger regulated emissions market that was officially launched through the
Kyoto Protocol, but they are one of the key devices linking carbon finance to the
development agenda of the Bank. The links between market-based environmental
management and the liberalization of poverty reduction are evident in a recent Bank
retrospective where the authors reflect that after ten years of carbon finance the Bank's
activity in carbon credits has helped "reduce the cost of achieving GHG reductions,
support sustainable development, and...benefit the poorer communities of the developing
world." 5 Beyond developing and pioneering finance mechanisms to implement offset
projects, the Bank is also the premier developer of the rhetoric, discourse and expertise
that surrounds and stabilizes the credibility of offsets.
Beginning with its first fund in 1999, the Prototype Carbon Fund, the World Bank has
become the unequivocal clearinghouse for the implementation of Article 12 of the Kyoto
Protocol, which grants non-Annex I countries (developing country members of the
UNFCCC) the right to sell "Certified Emissions Reductions" (CER) to Annex II
countries (OECD countries designated as countries which "pay for [emission] costs of
developing countries") through "Emission Reduction Purchasing Agreement" (ERPA)
contracts signed through either one of two markets: the Clean Development Mechanism
or Joint Implementation. The bank currently manages twelve carbon funds through its
Carbon Finance Unit, the premier body responsible for pioneering numerous offset
designs and creating flows of carbon-capital between Kyoto Annex II countries and
developing countries able to implement offset projects. The Bank's Carbon Finance Unit
has over 60 staff working for it, larger than any comparable carbon desk at any of the
" FCPF, 2008, p 11
5 See "The Role of the World Bank in Carbon Finance: An Approach for Further Engagement," the World
Bank, 2005.
' World Bank, "10 Years of Experience in Carbon Finance," 2009, p 2 .
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major investment firms around the world, with a total of $2.75 billion under management
as of 2011. Between 2003-2009, in the lead up to the launch of the Kyoto compliance
market, the CDM/JI jointly accounted for $27 billion in transactions in developing
countries and leveraged over $100 billion in underlying development project investments.
The overall CDM market, by far the larger of the two, includes over 2500 distinct
projects, of which the Bank manages about 250 independent projects. They manage
roughly 10% of the entire market and have a disproportionate share of the projects
located in Africa.
These twelve carbon funds fall into two basic types: national compliance funds and
experimental development funds. In the former, the bank serves as an active middle-man
between Annex II countries and different industrial sectors, serving as the go-between in
linking non-Annex I countries to regulated entities in Europe interested either in
marketing CERs or in entering directly into ERPAs that help Annex II countries meet
domestic reduction goals set out in Kyoto. For instance, a Spanish cement company that
has invested in the Bank's Spanish Carbon Fund expects to receive CERs that will help it
comply with Kyoto obligations. Their investment might be packaged by the Bank
according to the following scenario: Let us imagine that energy demand projections in a
developing country indicate the need for additional power generating capacity. Let us
assume that the utility sector in our developing country is nationalized and that the
government opens an offer for bid from companies capable of building them a new power
plant. Holding aside speculations about patronage networks in the granting of contracts,
we might assume that the government will be interested in meeting their demand at the
least cost possible. Given current global fuel prices, and the reliability of older
technologies, there is a high chance they might choose to build a pulverized coal fire
powered plant. What the offset market theoretically allows, is for our Spanish cement
company to come in and "offset" the emissions that would have been produced by the
coal-fired power plant installation by providing extra capital to invest in a cleaner, more
expensive fuel technology that still meets the government's energy demand projections.
Offset investments funded through the CDM include everything from the gasification of
urban waste heaps, the installation of small-scale hydropower plants and the construction
of facilities that destroy greenhouse gas byproducts from industrial chemical processing.
Despite there being no regulated market for forest carbon offsets, the above financing
scenario is more or less what the Bank envisions as the future of REDD+, except that
instead of being managed project by project, forests will be managed as a national sector
and CERs (or their equivalents) granted for investments which change the country's
trajectory of deforestation (measured against a pre-established national deforestation
"reference level"). The Bank has never hidden that their agenda is to launch a global
carbon commodity exchange that could also include offsets from REDD+. The Forest
Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), declared as much in its founding public document:
"Considering the financial volume that REDD is expected to generate, the FCPF will start
with a relatively small size. But it will aim to create a demonstration effect to 'jump start'
international efforts to tackle deforestation and degradation on a larger scale, and to
crowd in private capital."s6 This, more or less, is a succinct description of how the Bank
56 Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 2008, p4 .
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has conceived of its role in linking carbon to development-public money being spent to
structure a vehicle in which private capital can accumulate.
But unlike many of its previous funds, the FCPF is actually composed of two funds
targeting not just investments in emission reductions (the Carbon Fund), but in
developing the "readiness" of countries to participate in a REDD+ system (the Readiness
Fund). The facility itself, although created largely outside the UNFCCC process, bases its
legitimacy on Article 3.3 of the UNFCCC Convention which calls for mechanisms
"covering all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of GHG" and Article 4.7 invoking the
stance that "economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and
overriding priorities of the developing country Parties." 57 Also unlike previous carbon
funds of the Bank, which targeted project-based carbon finance, the "sector" focus of the
FCPF means that it is far more engaged in packaging national approaches to forest
management. This has meant an explicit agenda of in-country capacity building. "Few
institutions and countries" according to the announcing document of the FCPF, "have the
requisite technical expertise to translate the generic REDD discussions into the specifics
of their own national context, and design the monitoring and delivery mechanisms to
implement a performance-based REDD system at the national scale."5 8 This "lack of
expertise" legitimizes a broad scope of action for the Bank to undertake the project of
state building under the rubric of "readiness". 59 Although modest compared to many
other forms of Bank investments, the FCPF's roughly $427 million of pledged funds,
$212 million for the "readiness" mechanism and $215 million for the carbon mechanism
give it the means to selectively engage in certain countries, such as the DRC.
"Readiness" in many ways embodies the unconscious co-production of the global carbon
imaginary. There are two "objects", which are simultaneously being made "ready"-the
state and carbon. The unconscious aspect of this preparation, I argue, is that the Bank and
other actors are moving forward with a clear idea of how to manage forest carbon
through full-scale reforms of the forestry sector in the DRC without a deep or consensual
agreement about what carbon is or how it circulates in the lives of the Congolese or the
forest itself. It is rather the definition of carbon management "obstacles", and the
communities of experts circulating these definitions, which are driving the
transformations of the state, and in turn fixing the nature of carbon. These obstacles are
predicated on making forest carbon conform to other types of carbon offset accounting,
and thus other types of carbon. They boil down to five main obstacles: additionality,
57 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rio de Janeiro, 1992.
58Forest Carbon Partnership Facility 2008, p8.
* The FCPF formalized the concept of "readiness" as a criteria that countries needed to meet in order to be
eligible for performance payments - it consists in creating a credible reference scenario according to
UNFCCC approved methodologies; existence of a national REDD strategy that includes a robust analysis
of drivers and determinants of deforestation and recommendations for altering the underlying political
economy of these drivers (including legal and policy reforms); and the implementation of a measurement,
monitoring, reporting and verification (MMRV) system. The process of reaching "readiness" is also highly
scripted in the steps of presenting a Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN), whose approval by the FCPF then
open up $200k for the creation of a REDD-Preparedness Plan (R-PP); The approval of the R-PP, of which
the DRC's is only one of three so far approved then open up $3.4 million for actually putting the elements
of "readiness", described above, in place.
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moral hazard, leakage, permanence and opportunity costs. The first three obstacles have
traction with every carbon offset project, whereas the latter two are particularly salient to
forest carbon offset.
As with most offsets credits, forest carbon must address what economists call "principle-
agent" problems. These are problems that arise when a "principle" desires a certain action
to be done, but cannot do it herself and so must pay an "agent" to perform the action.
Often the agent, such as a doctor or a car mechanic, is particularly well situated to
perform this action because they are disposed of particular expertise or endowments not
mastered by the principle. As a result, the agent, according to classical economics, enjoys
an asymmetry of information in assessing the actual costs of their actions, which they can
exploit to their favor. Economists sometimes call this moral hazard, and it has played a
particularly dynamic role in discrediting the offset market structured around investments
in the destruction of potent GHG waste chemicals (HFC-23) from Chinese refrigerants
plants.
Additionality is the idea, already described above in the Spanish cement company
example, that without extra financing, a particular action would not otherwise occur. This
is a problem with every carbon-offset project and is related to the "principle-agent"
problem, but more typically, additionality is meant to serve as a criteria that gives
causative agency to an offset investor, thus invoking the notion that "but for" the
additional capital, a different, higher emission development decision would have been
made. Additionality is a criterion that establishes the right to claim the production of
emission reductions (standardized as CERs). Reaching agreement about additionality
often relies on assumptions about future emission trajectories that were prevented based
on predictive models. In the case of forest carbon, the key tool of assessing additionality
is the "reference level" of deforestation, which the activities "additional" activities
change.
The third major challenge for many types of carbon offsets is proving that there is no
"leakage" of the emitting activity, where actions that prevent emissions from occurring in
one place just push them to be produced somewhere else. This critique is raised, for
instance, against European countries who have claimed reductions over the Kyoto period
for closing down manufacturing processes that have simply been displaced and
outsourced to factories in China or other developing countries where emissions, labor and
other environmental standards are far less stringent. This question of leakage is
particularly relevant to terrestrial carbon offsets, where preventing deforestation in one
area of the forest may just push actors to another part, erasing any mitigation gains made
by supposed forest carbon investments.
Specific challenges to producing forest carbon offsets are the problems of permanence
and opportunity costs. Permanence of emission reductions is more difficult to assure
when dealing with carbon sinks compared to capital investments. Investing in 100,000 ha
of standing forest today does not mean that it will not be cut or burned down tomorrow,
whether by an act of humans or an "act of Nature". The risk escalates when dealing with
forests in post-conflict countries such as the DRC and is only insured against through the
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threat of punishment of non-authorized carbon emitting activities-a non-desirable and
likely impossible task in a place such as the Congo Basin. The final "obstacle" against
which forest carbon is framed is the challenge of adequately assessing the opportunity
cost of REDD+. Opportunity cost is an economic concept that describes the decision of a
"rational agent" to undertake a particular action when weighed against the next best
option of action. Action, in this sense follows the classical economic definition as
anything that optimizes an agent's utility. In relation to forest carbon finance, it is
difficult to accurately assess some of the opportunity costs of current land users for a
number of reasons, because land is available for multiple different uses, which may over
time change. Subsistence farmers must cultivate the land they live on in order to feed
themselves, they have no alternatives. And yet the "costs" of nourishment (i.e. what sum
of capital would it take to replace their labor) are incredibly difficult to assess because
although alternative food itself might be relatively inexpensive to purchase, getting it to a
rural forest community might be nigh impossible. At the same time, land which supports
subsistence farmers today that might produce in economic terms no more than $30 of
crop value an acre (if they surplus to share and if they could get it to market) may in
fifteen years be supporting industrial palm oil plantations generating $300 an acre of bio-
fuel additives. This makes the exercise of pricing the value of land on which sits standing
rainforests against all other possible uses a difficult project.
Overcoming the above carbon reduction "obstacles" forms the organizing principles of
the national REDD policies being advocated by the World Bank. Holding aside the
question about whether carbon has an actual nature outside the social definitions and
meanings within which humans embed it, we might next ask what are the consequences
of treating carbon as a matter of classical economic market manipulation? Many critics
see the transformation of forest carbon into a tradable commodity as a rife with
unpredictable and dangerous consequences resulting from the linking of markets to a
resource that is so vast and materially embedded in the lives and communities of
hundreds of millions of poor people. Other critics of argue that an incentive-based
approach to REDD introduces the same power dynamics and inequities already at play
between extractive corporations and communities, and within layers of elites and poor
communities themselves. These critics argue that REDD should take on a rights-based
approach to forest governance and focus instead on land tenure and policy reforms of
property in countries such as the DRC where communities currently have no legal title to
their lands. But where the resources, or the political will for this policy reform will come
from is difficult to ascertain and not well articulated by opponents of REDD if there are
not some kind of incentives for those in power to weaken their own grip on the control of
resources.
The phased financing of the FCPF, from "readiness" to "carbon offsets" forestalls the
question of the market by leaving room for the climate negotiations to decide the future
of the final REDD+ mechanism. But in the current REDD+ architecture of the DRC, for
instance, there is a dual approach to forest carbon financing: The government, with the
assistance of UN and Bank, is setting up a national REDD fund that will accept money
from outside investors (donor countries and companies) targeted at performance-based
emission reductions that would not produce CERs for resale. At the same time, the
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Ministry of Environment is setting up a national registry system that will allow for
project-based REDD+ financing from groups that want to produce CERs for sale on the
voluntary market.
For most people at the Bank, the question of whether or not to shape REDD+ into a
market mechanism means the life or death of REDD+ itself. Andre Aquino, the
representative of the World Bank's Carbon Finance Unit in the Democratic Republic of
Congo argues that without private capital "You're stuck with ODA [Overseas
Development Aid], which is unreliable and too small. And that's the challenge for the
DRC. Will they ever really be able to attract private investment. It's the dilemma for
DRC and it's an international problem. Because unless REDD is really commodified, the
private sector won't be participating.. .my position is that I see a lot of risks, and we need
to mitigate these risks. But unless we do that, REDD will just be a nice idea that
generated a lot of papers and conferences, and it will be a failure."60 It is fair to say that
all the "readiness" actions currently occurring in the DRC leave the door wide open for
its participation in a regulated forest carbon offset market.
After the launch of the FCPF and the deeper deliberations on development and climate
change reflected in the Bali Action Plan at COP 13, the Bank proposed the creation of
another fund, called the Climate Investment Fund, that would scale-up financing
assistance to carbon projects in the least developed countries and serve as bridge
financing "to assist in filling immediate financing gaps" in advance of an eventual
agreement on international carbon regulation (now punted to 2015).61 The Climate
Investment Fund is actually a family of funds with pledged donations of $6.5 billion, and
one of the funds is the Forest Investment Program (FIP), a $558 million finance vehicle
dedicated to experimental investments in REDD+. FIP fills the gap between "readiness"
and performance-based payments by providing a select number of pilot countries
significant funds to invest in activities targeting country specific drivers of deforestation.
Accordingly, to the Forest Investment Program Design Document asserts that, "there is
limited knowledge regarding the relative effectiveness of alternative approaches to
reversing those drivers under different national circumstances. Despite several decades of
investment in efforts to reduce deforestation and degradation, there remain few examples
of rigorous impact assessment, monitoring, and evaluation that would enable specific
outcomes to be associated with specific interventions. There is thus an urgent need for the
design of new investments in improved forest management to incorporate an explicit
learning agenda to close this knowledge gap." 62
In the DRC, these alternatives are captured in the recently released FIP Investment Plan
and include subsidies to create small-businesses that manufacture less-carbon intensive
goods and products (improved cook-stoves; acacia charcoal plantations; improved
charcoal making technology) for villagers. The participation and launch of these
businesses also increased entrepreneurial activity into the Congo with financing that is
60 Interview CC-027 with Andre Aquino, 5/20/11.
6] World Bank, Strategic Climate Fund, 6/3/2008, p8 .
62 Climate Investment Funds, Design Document for the Forest Investment Program: A Targeted Program
Under the SCF Trust Fund, 7/7/09, pl.
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otherwise really difficult to find in the Congo. We will look much more closely at the FIP
Investment Plan in the DRC in a subsequent chapter.
UN-REDD: Whole-of-Government Carbon Management
If the FCPF was intended to be the mechanism that would first reform countries policies
and sector Ministries in charge of land, forests and finance in order to get the country
prepared to sell "performance-based" carbon reductions, the FIP serves as bridge capital
to "work-out-the-kinks" in the "readiness" planning before actual performance metrics
are applied to FCPF carbon investments. But bringing together the entire portfolio of
"readiness" interventions in developing countries and linking that to ongoing forest
governance challenges was more than the Bank was ready or capable to oversee. At the
same time that the FCPF was being launched at Bali, the United Nations, at the urging
particularly of Norway, took the initiative to create a coordinating unit within the United
Nations that could provide ongoing technical support and in country oversight to the day-
to-day crafting of the "readiness" agenda being funded by the Bank.
In June 2008, the UN-REDD Programme Fund was proposed as a Multi-Donor Trust
Fund to be managed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) with the aim
of assisting "developing countries prepare and implement national REDD+ strategies."63
A combination of staffing expertise from UNDP, the United Nations Environment
Program, and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the UN-REDD vision of
carbon finance is to prioritize "developing sustainable national approaches that promote
equitable outcomes and ensure that countries use reliable methodologies to assess
emission reductions." 64 UN-REDD is funded by five donor countries, but 85% of its
funding ($125 million) comes from Norway. Nine countries were selected for phase 1 of
funding, but there are currently 14 countries receiving UN-REDD funding and 21 other
countries with partnerships that could lead to REDD funding. The largest recipient of
UN-REDD aid is the Democratic Republic of Congo, receiving $7,383,200.
The goal of the UN-REDD is to prepare countries for REDD+ governance which
includes, MRV and monitoring of emissions reductions, engagement with local
communities and indigenous peoples in preparing REDD plans, ensure metrics for
measuring "multiple benefits" from REDD+, creation of transparent, equitable and
accountable systems for REDD+ payments and making sure REDD+ is used as a
"transformational catalyst of developing a green economy in recipient countries."6 5 UN-
REDD pitches a big tent. The UN-REDD work-stream is broken into two general
segments: 1) a global program that is working toward developing standard MRV systems,
and connecting national efforts; and 2) a national program steering committee that
63 Eligibility of "REDD+ countries" was not explicitly formalized at Bali, but through subsequent meetings.
Particularly the Oslo Climate and Forests Conference of 2010, where UNFCCC negotiators met to create
the REDD+ Partnership, an ad hoc group of 50 donor countries and developing countries with significant
standing tropical rainforests.
6 Taken from the UN-REDD Programme website "About" page, http://www.un-
redd.org/AboutUNREDDProgramme/NationalProgrammes/tabid/584/Default.aspx
65 Taken from UN-REDD program documents posted on Climate Funds Update, a joint initiative of the
Heinrich Boll Stiftung (HBF) and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI):
http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/un-redd-programme
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"provide day-to-day management of the Joint Programme, coordinate national REDD
activities, ensure whole-of-government responses, and integrate REDD into national
development planning processes." 66 The whole-of-government response is a relatively
recent flavor of public sector theory, which UN-REDD is in many ways pioneering in its
recipient countries, including the DRC.
Whole-of-government is a holistic concept of public administration that focuses on
horizontal coordination between public sector agencies and collaboration with non-
government actors in an effort to achieve better delivery of public sector goods and
services. It emerged in Britain as a policy response of Tony Blair's administration to the
disappointing results of the New Public Management reform agenda, which emphasized
"performance management, single-purpose organizations, and structural devolution" of
public sector functions and "may have produced too much fragmentation and a lack of
cooperation and coordination, hence hampering effectiveness and efficiency." 67 Whole-
of-government management, as it emerged in the mid-2000s aimed to correct this
fragmentation by recentralizing authority and convening power of state institutions.
Certain complex, cross-cutting public sector issues, such as national security, sustainable
development, energy policy and climate change have triggered whole-of-government
management responses. According to two Norwegian organizational theorists, "This
trend is most evident in the Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the United Kingdom,
Australia, and New Zealand.. .but is also occurring in other countries, such as the United
States, under the heading of collaborative public management." 68 Indeed, the primary
example they cite of a whole-of-government response is the Department of Homeland
Security, in the U.S., which established central authority mechanisms over a disparate
range of security functions and responsibilities while giving more autonomy to officials
fulfilling these functions. U.S, Defense Secretary Robert Gates officially embraced this
approach to national security in a 2009 Defense Department report, which stated that,
"The Department supports institutionalizing whole-of-government approaches to
addressing national security challenges." The document also called for the creation of "an
authoritative national-level strategic guidance document that addresses interagency roles
and responsibilities, and resolves seam issues between agencies."6 9
That an institutional design concept touted by the U.S. Pentagon as a way to improve it's
military engagement in Afghanistan is also an underlying administrative tool in the UN's
approach to REDD points to similar strategies for dominating rural, difficult to manage
locations. Indeed, a whole-of-government approach to development was explicitly
instrumentalized in a report by the OECD in 2006 called "Whole of Government
Approaches to Fragile States." The report, written as a manual for OECD countries,
recognizes that as a result of "global concerns such as international security and crime,
66 Ibid
67 Christensen, Tom and Per Laegreid, "The Whole-of-Government Approach to Public Sector Reform,"
Public Administration Review, November/December 2007, p1060.
68 Ibid, p1059.
69 Pincus, Walter, "Pentagon Recommends 'Whole-of-Government' National Security Plans", Washington
Post, February 2, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/02/01/AR2009020101964.html
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fragile and failing states have increasingly become a preoccupation of the international
community" and promotes "WGA" as an intervention strategy that contributes to
realizing "the overall objective of long-term development and stability in fragile states at
a lower overall fiscal cost." 70 UN-REDD's application of a whole of government
approach through the governments of tropical forest countries represents an intellectual
colonialism on Anglo heritage transmitted and reproduced by international institutions.
Yet the deeper irony is that while the UN-REDD is implementing its agenda through
techniques critical of the New Public Management revolution of the late 1990s, much of
the developing world is undergoing World Bank and UN sponsored processes of
decentralization and devolution of political and administrative authority - something seen
as a crucial step toward encouraging democracy and local participation in the life of the
state, but also potentially at odds with the "whole-of-government" agenda.
The National REDD Coordination unit in the DRC Ministry of Environment is a prime
example of a "whole-of-government" agenda in action, "a coordinative structure inside
[an] existing central structure" that "increase[s] the strategic leadership role of the
cabinet.'71 Indeed, all the UN-REDD countries have similar "coordinative structures." 72
The invocation of "WGA" in the case of UN-REDD is an instrumental application of
institutional design, a hope that structural conditions well lead to positive program
outcomes. This is contrasted to a "cultural-institutional" perspective of administrative
reform that suggests that all formal institutions will inevitably need to develop their own
informal norms and culture in order to function. 73 The "cultural-institutional" perspective
argues that structure alone is not enough to account for expected outcomes.
We will see more in the chapter on the CN-REDD how the expatriate staff negotiate their
way between a Congolese REDD process and a REDD process proscribed by Anglo-
saxon public sector theories. The WGA approach is taken in the hope that it will both
discipline the Congolese state, even while there is pressure by international partners such
as the World Bank and IMF to disaggregate service delivery and outsource the
management of public goods. Carbon management itself provides a locus to see these
contradictory and imported concepts of governance at play, as the next chapter on the
day-to-day functioning of the CN-REDD makes clear.
70 OECD, "Whole of Government Approaches in Fragile States," DAC, 2006, p7 .
71 Christensen and Laegreid, 2007, p1061.
72 For instance, take the Bolivian UN-REDD program as an example: A National REDD Team was
established in July 2009 to create the National Forest and Climate Change Strategy and R-PP documents.
This National Team includes government officials, national consultants hired by the Ministry of
Environment and Water, international consultants from a company hired by the Danish Embassy in order to
facilitate the creation of the FCPF document, one UN-REDD consultant and one GTZ consultant.
73 See Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," American Sociological Review, Volume 48, Issue 2, 1983,
147-160.
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Chapter Three
The National REDD Coordination:
An Ethnography of Post-Colonial Carbon Bureaucracy
The Place Where Maps are Made
The National REDD Coordination (CN-REDD) is located in a complex of buildings in
downtown Kinshasa owned by the construction firm SAFRICAS (African Society of
Construction and Asphalt). Founded in 1923 by a group of Belgian investors, SAFRICAS
was sold in 2000 to an American business family, the Blattners, who have vast interests
in nearly every commodity market in the Congo, including one of the largest timber
companies (SAFBOIS, 2m acres under concession), as well as palm oil, coffee, cacao and
rubber plantations, cassiterite processing facilities and one of Congo's only operating
domestic airlines - African Company of Aviation (CCA). The SAFRICAS complex,
known as a concession in the DRC (just like a forest or mining concession), is a typical
feature of Kinshasa's urban fabric, where most property of any value is surrounded by a
tall cement wall, rolled barbed-wire and closed in by large metal gate with attendant
guards. The SAFRICAS concession, with a touch of irony, is called the "Conservation
Ghetto", because despite the deep connections of the Blattners to Central African
resource extraction, their real estate interests serve as the rented office space for the
World Wildlife Fund (WWF), World Resources Institute (WRI), the Observatory of
Central African Forests (OFAC), and, as already noted, the CN-REDD.
SAFRICAS squats under the shadow of a large, Lebanese-owned apartment tower whose
street front is crowded with local vendors of cell-phone cards, peanuts and those sweet
green oranges found all over Central African cities and towns. Adjacent to the
Conservation Ghetto is the main artillery depot for MONUSCO74 in Kinshasa, a
concession right on Boulevard 30 Juin framed by guard towers, walls lined with sandbags
and rows of tank and other heavy weaponry glimpsed through brief opening and closings
of their assiduously guarded gate. Toward the back of SAFRICAS, under a couple trees
sometimes populated by the squawking retorts of African gray parrots are the crammed
offices of the CN-REDD. Consisting of 8 small rooms with buttermilk colored walls and
door and window frames cut from an un-identified species of Congolese red-wood, the
offices house the day-to-day activity of a small group of staff from the Ministry of
Environment and the United Nations Development Program who make up the CN-
REDD. It is the headquarters for all REDD planning, preparation and design in the
Congo. On the wall near the entrance of the office hangs a map of the Congo, which
includes all the "reconverted" forest concessions, as well as all the "aire protegds," of the
DRC. At the bottom of the map are the published logos of its makers, including WRI and
the MECNT logo, with support from USAID, CARPE, Leica (the optics company) and
ESRI (makers of the software GIS). It's titled: "Domaine Forestier de la Democratique
Republique de Congo" (The Forest Domain of the Democratic Republic of Congo).
74 MONUSCO is the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the
largest and longest servicing UN peacekeeping mission in the history of the UN.
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CARTE 3: AFFECTATION DU DOMAINE FORESTIER DE L'ETAT EN JANVIER 2009
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Figure xx. WRIMap takenfrom their website following recent conversions of DRCforest
concession titles in 2o9te
The map, as an object, is a good entry point into understanding the nature of
environmental bureaucracy in the Congo as a complicated site of state-building patterned
on the concerns and interests of international institutions, bilateral donors and scientific
experts. The Domaine Forestier shows 65 timber concessions officially approved for
tconversion" under Article 155 of the 2002 Forestry Code, in addition to conservation
parks. The converted concessions were selected following a legal review of all forest
concessions at the end of the last Congolese war 76 Preceding the review, which ended in
2009, there were 151 titled concessions, many of them in the hands of foreign speculators
and government officials interested in one day flipping the titles to an actual timber
77 IteT~ew C-077
company for a handsome sum, but unable to exploit it themselves. 77But with the passage
of the Forest Code in 2002 and initial steps toward a rationalization of forest management
in the DRC, the World Bank and other donors pressured the government to go through
the title conversion process in exchange for technical assistance and $90 million in aid
75Map is taken from the World Resources Institute website http://www.wri.org/map/la-republique-
democratique-du-congo-affectation-du-domaine-forestier-de-letat-en-janvier-2009
76 See Debroux et al, 2007.
77' Interview CC-033.
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Reorganizing the forestry sector makes sense both from a development planning and a
conservation perspective, but not necessarily from a political perspective. Most of the
major logging companies, while not pleased with the reconversion process, went along
because they realized that the glut of concessions was causing disorder in the sector
overall and complicating their relationships with NGOs and the government. 79 The
government, meanwhile, was collecting a pittance of the estimated tax revenue on the
concessions, while companies claimed they were diligently paying taxes to government
representatives and it was not the company's fault if the receipts never made it out of the
hands of the custom officials at the government Port of Matadi. Likely there was hand
greasing on all sides, but the conversions, nonetheless, proceeded and the Congolese
State is now making a stab at bureaucratic control of its resources. It is toward this end of
rationalization that the World Bank and other donor countries are trying to promote new
habits of governance through rules of resource management.
It is also from this perspective that we can again look at the converted forest concession
map hanging in the hallway of the CN-REDD, and understand that international NGOs
have often played a critical role in bolstering the rationalization of resource management,
collaborating on projects with environmental line ministries in developing countries that
map "sovereign" territory through bi-lateral donor money. This is often how the
conservation agenda is brought to bear in a country such as the DRC where an aid
agencies such as USAID will offer financing for a forest sector reform, whose process is
accompanied by the development of tools, such as the map of WRI, that forge this new
narrative of a legality over space, anchoring the civic authority of the state in
representational devices like maps.
The CN-REDD, on the other hand, offers a more complex, if no less fraught venue for
crafting the new tools of territorial sovereignty. The principal difference between the CN-
REDD and the kind of collaboration that produced the WRI map is that the CN-REDD is
an ad-hoc entity, created through a Ministerial decree, where staff from the Ministry
work directly on a day-to-day basis with technical advisors from the United Nations
Development Program to construct the REDD architecture of the country. This is much
more intimate, yet hardly a new strategy of development. A number of bi-lateral aid
agencies favor this hands-on influence within the governments of their former colonies
(particularly the Germans and the French). 80
78 See John Vidal, "Sold Down the River", The Guardian, September 21, 2007. Vidal writes, "New forest
laws and after the World Bank imposed a moratorium on new concessions in 2002, in return for $90m of
development aid." http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/sep/22/congo.environment
79 Some of the new requirements are aimed at increasing the transparency and rules formalizing benefit
sharing of timber companies. For instance, the new Code requires them to release a more thorough, and
government vetted, "land use plan" for their concessions, which include clauses that protect local
communities and simplify the tax system making it harder for officials to ask for bribes.
80 This is worth comparing to the aid agencies of America, Sweden or Norway, who almost never embed
their development staff directly within foreign government offices and often have explicit rules forbidding
them to pass money through the hands of developing country governments. Conversation w/USAID staff
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While not entirely new as an organizational structure, the CN-REDD nonetheless
represents some of the latest thinking in efforts to merge international environmental
concerns with the stark development challenges that shape life in the DRC. I spent 6
weeks in this small office with the roughly 18 staff of the CN-REDD following their
daily conversations, attending meetings and conferences with them, asking them about
their rationale for doing particular things and even chipping in on some of the research,
presentation and translation of their material. The following chapter frames the creation
of the CN-REDD as a hybrid structure of international and national concerns within the
Ministry of Environment, designed eventually to wither away and die once the legal
framework for REDD+ is operational in the DRC.
Translating REDD+ into Kinois
The CN-REDD is the domestic locus where carbon development discourse is being
converted into law, and the law, ideally, transformed into practice. When asked to
compare the REDD+ initiative with previous development initiatives steered through the
Ministry of Environment over the past 30 years, the National REDD Coordinator, Leon
Kanu Mbizi, emphasized the REDD+ initiative's attention to institutional governance:
"The main difference, is that today with REDD, there is a document which puts in place
real structures to manage the process. You have the National REDD Committee, the
Interministerial Committee and the National REDD Coordination Unit. So there is this
formalization of structures that will evolve over the course of the process, and this will
give us at least a slightly better chance of having functioning, autonomous structures
within the Ministry that will assure the sustainability of REDD+ actions."81
The document referred to by Kanu Mbizi is a decree issued by the Prime Minister of the
DRC on November 26, 2009, which nationalized the carbon finance planning in the DRC
by setting up three Congolese bodies with different authority over the REDD+
preparation process which were debated and approved by the Cabinet. 82 These include
the National Committee, the Interministerial Committee and the National Coordination.
The first two committees provide the political legitimacy of the REDD+ planning
process. The National Committee is comprised of 13 members representing different
ministries, the private sector, civil society and academics and is chaired by the Secretary
General of the Ministry of Environment. Theoretically, the mission of the National
Committee is to "define the orientations and guidelines of the REDD process, approve
the Interministerial Committee's and National Coordination's respective work plan...and
implement a national fund and establish the forms of management and redistribution of
subsidies and resources deriving from the REDD process."8 3 It is the primary decision
making body of the country regarding REDD, whereas the Interministerial Committee is
in place largely to assure that all relevant ministries implicated in REDD+ planning be
member at Forest Day, at the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Conference of Parties 17 in
Durban, South Africa, 12/05/2011.
811nterview CC-029 with Leon Kanu Mbizi, 5/24/11.
82 DRC Decree No 09/41, 11/26/09.
83 Ministry of Environment, Conservation of Nature and Tourism, "Democratic Republic of Congo REDD
Preparedness Plan v3.1" (DRC R-PP v3.1), July 2010, pl6
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kept abreast of developments, particularly related to cross-Ministerial issues such as land
use planning, land tenure and financial decentralization. Finally, the National
Coordination is assigned with "providing for daily management of the REDD national
planning and monitoring activities provided in the annual work plan that will assure these
initiatives reach their expected results."84 The National Coordination is put under the
supervision of the Director of Sustainable Development within the Ministry of
Environment, a post created and managed by the lead UN climate negotiator for the
DRC, Vincent Kasulu.
In the country's official REDD Preparedness Plan (R-PP), submitted and approved by the
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility in July of 2010 and which outlines the creation of
these bodies, there is a note indicating that "these committees will be operational before
mid-201 0."5 The National Coordination, whose staff actually wrote the R-PP, was up
and running as of May 2009, nearly 6-months before the REDD+ decree signed by the
Prime Minister, and a year before the creation of the political bodies intended to oversee
the process. The political legitimacy of REDD+ planning in the Congo is something that
has always been sought after the fact, or as an outcome of "readiness" planning instead of
its starting point. "The proposed [REDD+] structure is likely to be legitimate to the
national authorities involved in decision-making," writes Bruno Guay, a CN-REDD staff
from UNDP and Andre Aquino, a World Bank staffer linked to the FCPF, "to the extent
that they are actively participating in the decision-making process giving rise to this
structure and that they are active players in the proposed system."86 One has the sense
that this phrase is not only descriptive, but is meant itself to be performative, producing
the circuit by which legitimacy might be verified.
Approached from the vantage of an international process-steered loosely from the hands
of the UN-REDD and the joint World Bank programs of the Forest Carbon Partnership
Facility and Strategic Climate Fund-translating REDD+ into national government
structures that can manage forest carbon is very much a process of trial and error in
which legitimacy is constantly being negotiated. The R-PP is the anchoring document
from the perspective of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, which offers $3.4 million
for each of the 37 designated REDD countries to prepare themselves to implement REDD
mechanisms.87 All the R-PPs that have been submitted to the FCPF as of the time of this
writing follow a fairly formulaic outline which includes minimum two components that
focus broadly on preparing a national coordination unit within the recipient government
that can manage outreach efforts designed at "Information, Education and
Communication" with citizens and institutions as well as "consultations, mobilizations
and community empowerment" across the population; as well as concrete plans for
84 Ibid, p17.
85 Ibid, p16.
86 Guay, B. and Aquino, A., "Implementing REDD+ in the Democratic Republic of Congo: an analysis of
the emerging national REDD+ governance structure" a paper presented at the Forest Biodiversity in
Changing Climate Conference at the University of Freiburg, August 2011, p12.87 The nine country's with finalized R-PPs as of 01/20/12 include: DRC, Ghana, Guyana, Indonesia, Kenya,
People's Democratic Republic of Lao, Nepal, Panama, Republic of Congo. Only three of these, including
the DRC however, have actually moved on to signing with the FCPF for the full "Preparedness Grant" of
$3.4 million. Note that Brazil is not an eligible member of the FCPF REDD countries.
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"building the national Strategy and technical, institutional and legal readiness."88 In the
Congo's R-PP, these elements are called Component 1 and Component 2. Two additional
components to the overall strategy are also included: Component 3 is called "Building
and implementation of a programme of experimentations" and Component 4, which is
"Building and anticipated implementation of the REDD+ Strategy." These two
additional components are the main subjects of the subsequent chapter, but for now we
will focus on dynamics of the institution and individuals implementing the R-PP through
the CN-REDD.
Even though REDD+ planning is embedded and adapted to pre-existing government
structures in the Congo, it leaves maximum room for the technical advisors, at least
initially, to connect REDD+ both downward and upward. Down through the institutional
layers of the Congolese government proposing modifications of Congolese legal
institutions, particularly those institutions governing the rights of villagers to use, manage
and benefit from adjacent lands; and up through shifting international standards and
protocols such as the FCPF framework for preparedness, the Verified Carbon Standard,
the Clean Development Mechanism and the ongoing and troubled future of post-Kyoto
UNFCCC negotiations. The double direction of translation is largely in the hands of the
UN technical staff that are constantly trying to discern and negotiate the will and
impressions of the native bureaucrats who are their counterparts.
Credibilitv, Participation and Legitimacy
Out of the eighteen odd staff that made up the CN-REDD offices while I was a visitor,
five were international expatriate "experts" paid for the by the United Nations
Development Program (Congolese staff, on the other hand, were paid for by the World
Bank's Forest Conservation Partnership Facility). All the expats were young-under
35-and incredibly hard working. Bruno Guay, a French-Canadian, was the first official
staff of the CN-REDD, hired as technical advisor in April 2009 along with the National
Coordinator Leon Kanu Mbizi, to launch the process of writing the R-PP. While I was in
Kinshasa, Guay was overseeing the third component of the R-PP, preparing a suite of
pilot REDD+ projects on the ground intended to provide what the Bank and UN call
"learning by doing" experiments with local communities about how REDD+ might
provide alternatives agricultural and fuel burning practices that would reduce pressure on
forests. All in all there are 8 official pilot experiments supported by the government and
funded by the Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF), a joint program under the auspices of
the Norwegian (NORAD) and U.K. (DFID) development agencies. The CBFF has had an
active presence in the region for the past decade or so, but recently shifted all their new
project funding to carbon forestry related projects, including about $25 million within the
DRC to be spent over the course of 3 years beginning in 2012. This will be some of the
first, concrete REDD+ money spent at the community level, and includes the project in
which I assisted Woods Hole Research Center in the Province of Equateur.
After Guay and Kanu Mbizi, the CN-REDD hired Philomel Monkende, to run the
national information, education and communication component (he was no longer there
88 DRC R-PP, 2010, p7.
89 Ibid
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when I arrived), and then, in the midst of conducting Provincial workshops to solicit
input for the R-PP, the UN-REDD program decided to hire an additional technical expert
with slightly more experience than Bruno Guay. Fabian Monteils, a French management
school graduate with nearly 10 years experience in business consulting to be the senior
technical advisor. In the words of Monteils, "I am the senior technical advisor, and wear
three different hats; the first and the most essential one is the one I wear with the National
Coordination. So senior technical councilor is pretty much the Vice-Coordinator. This is
more or less how I'm presented by the Ministry, by the Director of Sustainable
Development and by Mr. Kanu at the national level. So, in this title I'm considered
basically like a member of the Ministry who is working on the national REDD process.
And then, I also have this title of Senior Technical Councilor, which is through the UN-
REDD, by which I coordinate the efforts of the three UN-REDD agencies [UNDP, FAO
and UNEP] in their support to the national process. And am attached administratively to
UNDP.. .but 99% of the time I wear the Ministerial and CN-REDD hat." 90
It was following the hiring of Monteils, in December of 2009, that according to Kanu
Mbizi, "the [CN-REDD] team swelled up to its current levels, and now with the R-PP
approved, we really entered the preparation phase where we need to get structures in
place."91 In addition to Bruno Guay, the CN-REDD hired Bruno Hugel as technical
advisor., Prior to joining the UN, Hugel spent four years in Eastern DRC managing a
community conservation project around Virunga National Park for the World Wildlife
Fund targeting small-scale reforestation, production and marketing of charcoal to take
pressure off the forest edges of the Park. Hugel began work in November 2010,
beginning what would become the national Investment Plan submitted to the Forest
Investment Program (FIP) while I was in Kinshasa. Finally, Peirrot Rakotoniaina, a
Malagasy staff member formerly with Conservation International in Madagascar, was
serving as technical coordinator, helping the second component of the national strategy to
design social and environmental safeguards for the adoption of REDD+ projects. In
addition, there was a final expatriate in the CN-REDD while I was there working on a
temporary contract from UNDP-Stephane Salim, a French agronomist helping Bruno
Hugel in the design of the Investment Plan. Salim was the only trained biophysical expert
among the foreign staff with any professional knowledge of forest management, and by
December 2011 he was gone.
I focus primarily on the expatriate staff for two reasons. The first was that it was easier in
the short amount of time I spent in Kinshasa to communicate with and get close to them,
compared to the Congolese. I lived in accommodations briefly with Stephane Salim and
went regularly to dinners and other excursions around town with the two Brunos. This
experience contrasted intensely with the time I spent in Equateur Province, where I spent
nearly all my working and free time with Congolese. Kinshasa poses different challenges
to the researcher trying to straddle both local and international bureaucratic cultures.
Security-wise, for instance, it was extremely risky to move about the city except by
90 Interview CC-024.
91 Interview CC-029.
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vehicle 92, and yet most Congolese travel only in collective taxis, not hired cars, so
meeting up in the first place is difficult without imposing from the beginning a sense of
difference. The second reason I followed the expatriates more closely is that, besides the
Minister of Environment Jose Endondo himself and a few high-placed staff in the
Ministry, the technical advisors are the driving force behind the REDD+ planning
process. This conclusion was drawn not just from my own observations, but from the
comments of others as well, particularly other expatriates and Ministry of Environment
staff. Patrick Welby, a Belgian advisor to the Ministry of Environment, working closely
with Victor Kabengele (the national focal point for the Forest Investment Program within
the Ministry of Environment) saw this dynamic as a principle risk to the REDD+ process:
"What is important for you to understand is that [REDD+ is] very much...it's led from
the outside. Meaning that it's people that are very well trained working within, what they
call the Coordination National REDD, who have been very proactive in trying to raise
awareness on the one-hand and to prepare a plan and program on the other hand.. .it's
very much led from the outside, and probably not sufficiently from the inside... the
minister as an individual is very keen to see things progress, but other than he and his
subordinates, there is very, very little I'm afraid."93
Far from contesting this kind of comment from an outside observer, those intimately
involved in the REDD+ process are hyper aware of the precariousness of their position in
the DRC and the challenges of creating lasting structural conditions and staffing capacity
capable of managing revenues connected to carbon investments. For Monteils, the current
leadership of the Minister of Environment helps in part mask this vacuum of expertise
behind his endorsement. "What's important for this process is to be under the "umbrella"
of a political godfather, to a certain extent, at least until the process can launch a dynamic
within the government so that it is no longer dependent on just one person.. .but engages
the interests of other members of the political establishment.. .but let's be clear: we are
really at a moment where there is incredible risk to the whole process because of its
dependency on the support of one person and the threat of his replacement. At our level,
we need to try to reduce that as much as possible through technical instruments."9 4 But
stuffing these holes in capacity with more technical expertise from outside hardly
addresses the underlying problems. The DRC is suffering from a massively dilapidated
education system, left to ruin toward the end of Mobutu's rein and the intervening 15
years of war.
The State is caught in this dilemma of retiring their aging class of civil servants and
replacing them with a younger, less trained and largely less competent generation. Joseph
Ipalaka, the former Secretary General of the Ministry of Environment and currently a
9 My first day in the city after returning from the Equateur, I was held up at gunpoint and narrowly
avoided being stuffed into a car with three Congolese "police officers." This occurred at lOam on one of
the busiest streets in Kinshasa's downtown district on my way to a workshop on forest zoning being held
by the Rights and Resources Initiative and the Congolese Network of Natural Resources (RRN). Ironically,
I was within a stones throw of the Supreme Court building, walking along the Avenue de la Justice. I made
my street wanderings in Kinshasa very selective after that incident.
9 Interview CC-031 with Patrick Welby and Victor Kabengele, 5/27/11.
94 Interview CC-024.
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sitting member of parliament, sees this question of competency as a "serious problem for
the ministry. All the experts have grown old.. .now those of us left in the Ministry will be
retired within 5 years even though the youth now in the universities we don't train them
any more as foresters and despite that, the ministry of course needs biologists and
chemists as well, but the level of education has dropped so much since I was Secretary
General. It's something I've seen." 95 Despite an explicit agenda of capacity building
within both the "readiness" agenda of the FCPF and the UN-REDD planning, it is
impossible to replace an entire system of state education.
Andre Aquino, the representative from the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility in the
DRC, echoes Welby when asked about what he perceives as the greatest risks to the
process, "At a strategic level the question is can the DRC ever really benefit from
REDD? That's what I ask myself everyday. More on an operational side, there are
questions of how to strengthen capacity of the Ministry? We are doing a lot but it's very
outsourced everything, sometimes with little participation of real Congolese. It's a big
problem because of sustainability of this process in the long-term." 96 This kind of honest
assessment is forthcoming from nearly all the technical staff, and it does not extend just
to Congolese participation in the National Coordination, but to the dynamics of National
Committee and Interministerial Committees as well.
Aquino : "People will tell you that [the National Committee] is working but it's
not... to start with, it's very difficult to get these type of committees to work.
People don't have the incentives to participate.... And now things may change
because the FCPF decided to pay per diems, and high per diems.
Interviewer: Is that something you don't usually do?
Aquino: No of course not! This should be part of their activities as public
servants, as civil servants. The problem is that they get paid nothing as you
know. So, any time you have a process like that, especially ifyou have the World
Bank, the United Nations or other bi-laterals, they feel like there's money. And
people then try and stick to it for the money reason, not just because they should
be contributing to the process. That's frustrating."
Taken out of context, the above comments could construe a venal system of patronage
and corrupt officials looking to squeeze international institutions in any way possible to
earn a buck. But the frank reality of the life of civil servants in the Congo is one of
clinging impossibly from one paycheck to the next, which may be separated by months. 98
95 Interview CC-026.
96 Interview CC-027.
9 Interview CC-027.
98 The New York Times recently ran an article attributing the lack of dependable paychecks as one of the
reasons why the 2011 elections in the DRC, considered severely flawed by all international observers,
didn't generate more outrage from citizens. "If today we eat, tomorrow we'll drink tea," said Dieudonn6
Nsala, a father of five who earns $60 a month as an administrator at the Education Ministry. Rent is $120 a
month; the numbers, Mr. Nsala pointed out, simply do not add up. Are there days when his children do not
eat'? "Of course!" Mr. Nsala answered, puzzled at the question. "It can be two days a week," he said.
43
The lack of dependable income from the State introduces a dynamic in which those
Congolese who engage with multi-lateral and bi-lateral institutions to fulfill state
functions see their work of preparation and engagement as part of a collaboration in
which wealth should be shared. Nonetheless, the technical staff within the CN-REDD
have taken to calling the DRC a "Per Diem Republic" in an obvious play on the Banana
Republic's of the early to mid-20th century, but one adapted perhaps for the fragile state
club.
The Daily Fashions
Clearly REDD+ cannot solve all these more major economic and institutional issues of
sustained education funding and reinvestment by the State in its own population. So what
kind of attitude do the expatriates adopt in order to continue their day-to-day work? Guay
gives a hint when, in a conversation about non-profit organizations, he critiques what he
perceives as the NGO attitude toward the world. "I don't know what your experience is
with countries that rely heavily on aid, but I think everyone is trying to make a perfect
world and everyone forgets that it is not a perfect world that we live in and you have to
be pragmatic if you want to achieve goals. And so everyone manipulates this perfect
world discourse which is that of the West right now, to reach their own ends..." Guay's
attitude toward his work in REDD+ is a mixture of nihilism, pragmatism and heroism:
"The choice is we do nothing, and we let things go and business is as usual in the DRC
which is not good, or we try to do something imperfect. So we chose the latter."99
The Congolese in the Ministry of Environment with whom I spoke at length on the topic
frame REDD+ with a slightly different perspective. To them, REDD+ follows a long
legacy of previous, foreign development agendas that have come through the Ministry.
When asked about whether he thought REDD+ introduced new elements to the task of
governing the forest, Leon Kanu Mbizi summed up carbon finance as the latest iteration
of efforts at environmental improvement: "It's fashionable. During each period, there is
something in fashion, and REDD, it's in fashion today, but the forest is always there. In
1985, the FAO came with the PAFT (Priority Agenda for Tropical Forests). You had to
participate in the program or you wouldn't receive funding, so let's just say that the
management of the forest has always been there."' 00 Mbizi is over 70 years old and has
been with the Ministry since its inception in 1975. He began work initially in the Division
of Water and Forests, which at his time was part of the Ministry of Agriculture, so he has
a long perspective of resource extraction and sectoral reform within the Ministry. His
experience of REDD+ is shaped by this previous experience on projects such as the
PAFT:
Though residents here frequently gather on crowded street corners to argue politics, their daily struggle
may help explain why the capital did not experience sustained mass demonstrations after disputed election
results were announced last month. Sporadic protests and street clashes certainly erupted, but the margin of
survival here is simply too slim for most people to demonstrate for very long." Adam Nossiter, "In
Congolese Capital Power Cut Applies to Food," New York Times, January 2 2012;
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/0 3 /world/africa/in-congolese-capital-power-cut-applies-to-
food.html? r--2&hp
* Interview CC-002 with Bruno Guay, 3/16/11.
100 Interview CC-029.
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Kanu Mbizi: We did 9 studies, and we organized a conference with donors at the
Grand Hotel; I was the secretary of the conference, and we received so many
promises, but up till today, we haven't seen a single coin of everything that was
promised to us...Now we see REDD coming, and say what you will it's just the
new fashion, and again, we are here. We'll be here to see what it might bring
us.
Interviewer: Do you have more confidence or optimism with this project
compared to what's come before ?
Kanu Mbizi : We are always full of confidence and optimism when the projects
arrive. It's only at the end that we realize that we were too naive. When a
project arrives, we engage as much as possible, and after, when there are
problems, we stop and wait for the next one to come,"0
The sentiment of inequity in the relationships with outside organizations and other
developmental agencies is echoed across the Congolese to whom I spoke. Vincent
Kasulu, the head of the Ministry of Environment Division in which the CN-REDD is
housed, complained about the expectations that REDD+ was raising and his growing
disappointment of the lack of tangible projects investing in the Congolese and their lands.
My big concern is with the funds that will be made available to us. You see right
now that we have the UN-REDD and the FCPF, but it is my serious with that
most of these funds do not go to finance more studies. We have so many studies,
and we always fall back on the same conclusions about the forest. What we did
10 years ago, we redo 10 years after under a different denomination... So my
hope is that a big part of funds can be used for actual capacity building, by which I
mean equipment and vehicles. All these things we need in order to follow up REDD
activities on the ground.102
Kasulu made pointed comments about the new "eco-industry" in the Congo that was
benefiting from REDD financing to the detriment of the government. More studies means
more money outsourced to groups such as the FAO, PriceWaterhouseCoopers and
McKinsey Corporation, all of whom have produced technical reports for the MECNT on
REDD+ planning. Reports do not bring any political capital to Ministry Division heads
such as Kasulu, but jeeps, field tents and other material for surveying REDD projects
bring both credibility and tangible objects to put in the hands of under-equipped staff.
This kind of reflection comes from a seasoned Ministry of Environment director, and at
once expresses deep ambivalence about aid funding, while acknowledging a trenchant
dependency of the MECNT on outside support. This is an ongoing, if much softer
colonialism than before.
If REDD is the flavor of the day it still perpetuates this soft version of coercion. Ipalaka
traces the genealogy of dependency in the domain of environmental management back to
101 Interview CC-029.
102 Interview CC-033 with Vincent Kasulu, 5/28/11.
45
the original violence of Belgian colonialism and an abrupt rift with previous traditions.
The following quote is long but worth citing at length:
I think it [the abuse of nature] is a problem of culture; it's cultural, and we
can't change a people's mentality one generation to another. Even so, the
Belgians inculcated us with a respect for communal goods. We were scared of
communal goods. Maybe it was because of the methods they used that weren't
correct. The whip, the chicotte...so that after independence we told ourselves
"We are free, we can do anything now!" that we began to lose these habits for
communal goods. Tending to the forests and waters. All that existed before the
whites came and even after the first few years of the whites. It's as if our
ancestors had a scientific commonsense that we've lost today. They didn't have
schools, but they had this scientific commonsense about how to treat the
environment. Today, we've completely lost these values. Occidental culture is
illusory and we are nowhere. It is as if we were suspended. That's the whole
problem. It's this problem that until we become conscious of, well, once we
become conscious of it that's when we will begin to solve it.103
Beyond a particularly poignant romanticism for the lost past, Ipalaka also annunciates a
fracturing of a Congolese society that was brought all of a sudden in contact with itself by
the colonizer and all to quickly left to its own devices. In a way, Ipalaka is challenging
the very need for a Ministry of Environment, or reading the fact of the Congolese
Ministry of Environment as continuing proof of Occidental society's grip on Congolese
life. The dependency of the Ministry on outside support only confirms this eloquent echo
of generational pain.
Making the Needs of the Ministry
The Ministry's budget is drafted and approved by the Cabinet within the overall budget
of the Congolese State, but it receives a fraction of its operating budget from the State.
Overall budget requests for 2011 were between $37-$40 million to cover nature
conversation, forestry management, tourism and water sanitation. Over the last two years,
according to conversations with Patrick Welby and Victor Kabengele, the Ministry
receives roughly 10-15% of their requested budget. In other words, the Ministry receives
about $5 million to manage the second largest tropical forest territory in the world. Of
that $5 million, "Everything goes into salaries, and very little goes into investments and
training and equipment." For Welby the incentives to engage in REDD are not
mysterious from the Congolese side. "So this is why the Ministry is so dependent on UN-
REDD, on the World Bank, and other donors to implement such... ambitious is not
derogatory, but such big programs as REDD Preparedness. And Pilot projects and FIP
investment plans. We're totally dependent on outside public donations." 04 Welby is
running a program within the Ministry to track all outside donor money invested on
Forests and Conservation and shared with me his spreadsheet tracking aid money. "To
give you a rough idea, what the forestry sector and the conservation sector receives in
terms of allocations from the donor community is roughly $60 million a year. Which is
103 Interview CC-033.
104 Interview CC-03 1.
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almost double the Ministry budget.. .but what is actually being spent is probably 75% of
that."10 5
In other words, the amount of money being spent by the donor community on the budget
of the Ministry of Environment is an order of magnitude more than the actually money
being allocated to the Ministry from the government itself. And of this $60 million which
comes from the World Bank, the European Union, Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan
and a handful of smaller states.106 Most of this aid is being funneled through a major
forest sector reform initiative launched by the World Bank and other donor countries in
2003 called the National Program on Forests and Conservation of Nature (PNFoCo) that
is targeting legal and institutional reform, park monitoring and ecosystem preservation
(these two initiatives represent 70% of PNFoCo expenditures) as well as less significant
funds going to timber sector monitoring, ecosystem services valorization (i.e. carbon
sinks) and support toward local communities in improved resource management. Despite
the largesse, the government does not have the capacity to allocate all the budgeted donor
money, and ends up deploying only 75% of the available funds.
There are multiple, simultaneous governance and improved management initiatives going
on within the forestry sector in the DRC and it is difficult within the confines of this
thesis to do justice to all of them. 1 07 But PNFoCo is at the core of implementing the
Forestry Code from 2002 and as the principal World Bank forest initiative within the
DRC, coordinates a good deal with the Coordination National-REDD. Indeed, before
coming to lead the CN-REDD, Kanu Mbizi, was the Coordinator of PNFoCo. In May
2009, roughly a month after the launch of the CN-REDD and shortly after Kanu Mbizi
left PNFoCo, the DRC signed an accord with the International Development Association
(IDA) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) for $77 million to implement the
PNFoCo plan. Ultimately, this initiative is intended to rationalize forest management in
the DRC by tackling institutional hurdles such as providing funds for retirement payouts
to older staff of the MECNT.
REDD+ in the DRC is both a sequel and a parallel process to the planning and
preparation that occurred for PNFoCo. But whereas financing for PNFoCo is coming
from the Bank and the UN through the GEF, it is connected to a more traditional vision
of development designed to "help establish essential capabilities to secure law
'05 Ibid
106 As mentioned above, US-AID and other bi-lateral aid is spent within country, but does not pass through
the hands of the government; the large USAID conservation initiative in the region is called CARPE and
represents a significant portion of Congolese forest sector aid. These differences in aid culture result from
all sorts of national quirks of character and legacies of colonialism. Sweden, for instance, the 7 th largest
donor to rural development in the Congo, is blocked from giving directly to the Congolese State by
Swedish laws which prevent the Swedish foreign aid agency from passing aid in to the hands of
governments which do not meet certain standards of human rights protection and anti-corruption measures,
neither of which the Congo meets. All of their aid flows through intermediaries and non-profit groups.
107 Just to mention a couple more: the FLEGT program has been initiated by the EU to create a completely
traceable system of trade in timber. Again this movement borrows from the idea of complete transparency
that the designers of the REDD+ system are striving to achieve in the MRV. And again, within the
conservation realm there are a number of long running regional programs focused on the entire Congo
Basin, including CARPE (US-AID), COMIFAC (EU) and the Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP).
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enforcement in the forest sector and test community-based approaches to manage forests
holistically to the benefit of forest and indigenous populations, the local and national
economy, and the global environment."1 08 REDD+ is nested within a slightly different
rationale of resource use, and a slightly different structure of implementation. Kanu
Mbizi's comment comparing REDD+ to previous initiatives ("The main difference, is
that today with REDD, there is a document which puts in place real structures to manage
the process.) tells part of the story, but perhaps the crucial difference is the structure of
the CN-REDD itself. As one of the UNDP staff put it bluntly, "The originality of the CN-
REDD set-up is that it created long term technical advisor positions within a
governmental structure to assist the day-to-day operations of the cell." 09
Typically, World Bank consultants fulfill under short-term mandates, sometimes working
directly with government staff, but usually for no more than 6-months at a time. This is a
"developed country" model, which assumes that you already have a functional public
administration to which you are giving punctual and specific support. "This works well in
countries like Mexico," according to the CN-REDD staffer Bruno Guay, "but the
problem in DRC is that government is an empty shell, too such an extent that the vast
majority of staff recruited after 1980 are undereducated and ill-equipped to implement
projects." Whereas UN postings are typically longer-term (2+ years), they are not
embedded within line ministries. PNFoCo operates under the World Bank consultant
model, and this has created delays in implementing the broader agenda of the PNFoCo
("consultants hand out all the deliverables (turn key jobs) but nothing happens because
nobody is there to turn the key.""') According to Guay, the advantages of the CN-REDD
are that "we have combined the strength of the 'competent and deliverable minded WB
consultants' with the 'long term bureaucratic postings' of the UN."" 2
Centralizing the Maps
So it is clear that the way REDD, and "readiness," are conducted, as a development
project, are already different than previous work by the World Bank and the UN. These
longer-term embedded technical staff are intended in part to provide in-house "capacity
building" staff for the Ministries. According to the REDD Coordinator, Leon Kanu
Mbizi, this emphasis on "capacity building," differentiates REDD+ from other
development projects that he has seen at the Ministry of Environment:
In other times, when we [the Ministry] would conduct a study, we would call on
outside experts to come and provide us answers to our questions, but today, we
want to build say a Monitoring Reporting and Verification system [for REDD+],
the DIAF itself says that even if we know how to do forestry inventories, we
don't know how to do carbon inventories, so we need to start training people in
this new knowledge so they are able to get involved and manage the work. So
108 See World Bank. Integrated Safeguards Datasheet Prepared by a World Bank team lead by Giuseppe
Topa. Project, ID P100620, 02/03/2009.
0 Email correspondence with Bruno Guay, 1/13/12.
"0 Ibid
"' Ibid
112 Ibid
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there is an important emphasis on capacity building to get the country really
ready to manage these different [REDD+] activities."3
This is also why the REDD+ carbon financing initiative is giving a different force to the
sector and institutional reform called for through PNFoCo. Since 2009, there is consistent
follow-up by the technical and Congolese staff together on the reform agenda. REDD+
also provides the "positive incentives" for reform that most development projects do not:
additional money for the Ministries if they are actually able to demonstrate reductions in
deforestation and degradation, or increase in forest stocks. The European Commission
staff in Kinshasa charged with conservation management in the DRC says this dynamic
"opened eyes to new pots of money that weren't seen to exist there previously, linked to
new activities.""4 But in order to access these "pots of money", the financing must be
connected to institutional reform, and REDD+ has given added volume to the moves
within the government to resolve land use planning (conflicts between other Ministries
over who has the jurisdiction to issue permits, for instance, between mining and forestry
companies), land tenure issues and the legal status of communities as managers of
adjacent forest lands.
The finance structure discussed in the next chapter, the Forest Investment Program
Investment Plan shapes these "new activities" into finance tools, which, in order to be
"financed" require institutional reforms that address investment risks. Otherwise, the
tools will never attract additional money. As a result, the promise of greater amounts of
carbon financing "has forced the government to kick start some reforms that if there
wasn't this carrot at the end of the day, that there would not be funding for in this
country."11 5 This institutional reform process is where the UN's whole-of-government
approach to REDD is most visible. The CN-REDD unit, as an ad hoc unit, coordinates
the REDD initiative within the Ministry of Environment, but even more importantly
across other implicated Ministries through the National and Interministerial Committees.
This gives the Ministry of Environment a particularly novel role, according to Vincent
Kasulu in drawing together conflicting ministerial rules on land use. "It's in the
Interministerial Committee that we are trying to resolve these issues of agriculture rights,
mining rights and environmental rights and the authorities of these different ministries.
It's a complete mess right now on the issue of land planning. We are trying to create an
agricultural cadastre, a mining cadastre, a forestry cadastre and an urban cadastre, so that
we have all these maps that will ultimately help us avoid superposing multiple rights of
use on the same piece of land. All this depends on a national land use planning law."I 6
Contradictory claims over land uses have created problems among ministries before, and
REDD+ creates the need to be able to assign "carbon rights" to investors with the
assurance that no other activity will happen on land set aside for carbon finance projects.
According to people I spoke with in the Ministry and the donor community, this has
"13 Interview CC-029
114 Interview w/European Commission Environment and Forest Staff in Kinshasa, 5/18/11.
115 Interview CC-031.
116 Interview CC-033.
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created the most significant forum where the issue of national and use planning is being
addressed across ministries. For Daniel Tiveau, First Secretary of the Swedish Embassy
in the DRC, this is the most interesting thing about REDD as a policy initiative, it is
"creating a coordination between other sectors that wasn't seen before."'' 7 But it may be
quickly becoming a missed opportunity. UNDP staff was not impressed with the progress
of the Interministerial Committee, which was also demanding per diems to conduct their
work. Bruno Hugel, mentioned at one point that they were thinking of collapsing the
function of the Interministerial Committee into the National Committee, which also has
inter-ministerial representation.
But it may be more that the national REDD+ legislation, which created the
Interministerial Committee, is simply a non-starter with many Ministries. According to
Tiveau, Ministries are very turf oriented in the DRC and hold tightly to their individual
pots of money, and they do not yet see how they will benefit from REDD+. It is very
likely that neither REDD+, nor formally respected land codes will benefit those in power.
Large scale zoning of national territory is in a way the dream of the rational planner,
acknowledges Andre Aquino, but it is also perhaps incredibly unrealistic:
Ifyou don't clarfy ownership of land you can't easily invest in agriculture, so
the agriculture people are very interested in this. The mines are interested as
well, you have all this major conflict between forest areas, agriculture areas and
mines. So in general, there is interest on all sides. But this is a very
controversial area because basically you're deciding how to use the territory.
Whether you allocate it for mines, for conservation, for forest production and
logging, or for agriculture lands. This is the most politically complex thing. Not
even in developed countries do you have zoning that says.. .I mean, in the United
States you don't have a map that says: you do agriculture here and here; it's the
result ofpower struggles at the national at the local at the state levels. It's
historical. I remain a bit skeptical of what a top down process of macrozonage
will really be able to achieve. I am more of the philosophy that we should be
strengthening the capacity of the local and provincial level institutions and
decision making bodies, including civil society, for these fights to be fought at
that level." 8
Taking Aquino at his word, REDD+, or any massive rural development initiative in the
DRC, cannot succeed without reaching down to the level of local communities and begin
listening and soliciting ideas from rural populations about how to meet their needs. It is
not enough to solicit ideas, but to strengthen the links that show how local ideas influence
spending and other aid decisions. Reinforcing local level institutions that can provide this
kind of input and can make accountable decisions about how to spend public money
(whether international or national), is the kind of capacity building that REDD+ should
be doing. To the extent that REDD+ can move down the scale from the national level to
build capacity at the provincial and sub-provincial levels, we will see whether Aquino's
"philosophy" becomes a legacy of carbon finance.
117 Interview with Daniel Tiveau, First Secretary of Swedish Embassy, 5/14/11.
118 Interview CC-027.
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Need for Speed
Success is destabilizing, and the emergence of carbon-development and advances made
by the National Coordination has attracted the eyes of other members of Congo's
political elite toward the Ministry of Environment. One member of parliament I spoke
with emphasized to me that Joseph Endundo's position as Minister was far from secure,
partly as a result of this new cache of the Ministry of Environment gained from REDD+.
Endundo is not part of President Joseph Kabila's party, and does not have a significant
political base himself. He is half Portuguese and half Congolese and comes from
Mbandaka, the capital city of Equateur. Equateur is the home province of Mobutu, as
well as the main opposition leader to Kabila immediately after the assassination of his
Laurent Kabila - Jean-Pierre Bemba. Bemba is currently in the Hague on trial for crimes
against humanity committed during the Congolese wars. Endundo was a member of
Bemba's circle and a prominent business himself during Mobutu's reign. His success as
Ministry of Environment could also be his demise, and the fact that REDD+ planning in
the CN-REDD is so dependent on being under the "umbrella" of a "godfather" gives the
CN-REDD and its staff an intense need for speed. They do not have the luxury of moving
slowly and so the process lives in this incredible tension; they are moving faster than
most other countries (DRC was the fourth REDD country to have their R-PP done; one of
only 3 countries out of the 37 eligible REDD countries to have been granted the FCPF's
full $3.6 million REDD Readiness grant; the other two are Indonesia and Nepal; and they
are one of only two countries that were included in both the initial UN-REDD countries
and the Forest Investment Program; the other country being Indonesia), but it would be a
mistake to consider the DRC one of the most "ready" REDD+ countries. The need for
speed here is coupled with the capacity challenges, which creates a bizarre whirl of
planning rationale. For instance, you cannot loose the attention of the Minister, because
then you loose the legitimacy and power needed to move forward.
This "godfather" feature of Congolese politics is a refrain repeated at every level of the
State. Steams writes about how Kabila's government relies largely on off the book
payments given through enveloppes: "If you want to buy votes in Parliament to squelch
the audit of your state-run company, you pass around envelopes. When you want to
obtain a lucrative contract to supply the police with beans and rice, you make sure the
officials on the procurement board all get envelopes delivered to their home." Kabila
engages in what Steam euphemistically calls "envelopperie ", a broad informalization of
government by keeping legitimate political and economic actors enacting the goals of the
state beholden to Kabila's personal favor, instead of the bureaucracy. "Instead of passing
through his Ministry of the Interior, for example, Kabila will call governors or military
commanders directly. Instead of authorizing decent official salaries for civil servants, he
allows many to scrape by on salaries of less than $100 a month, only to send them
envelopes of several thousand dollars at his discretion to keep them happy. This parallel
management weakens institutions but makes officials depend directly on the
presidency." 19
Fabian Monteils, with a rueful tone in his voice acknowledges this trap: "You are forced
119 Steams, 2011 p322.
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to go really fast because if you don't have political support and financial support in this
country, you have nothing at all. And this political support you can only have for a given
window of time. The Minister, for example, from the very beginning has been deeply
involved, but today, already, he's starting to talk more about the issue of water. Naturally,
REDD is not the only thing to pay attention to in the Ministry of Environment. And if in
the next months there are some important deals that begin to come together around water,
in terms of dozens of millions of dollars that might come together to be spent on the
ground, politically, he can't drown himself too much with REDD because people will
begin to say 'Listen, you're putting all your energy, all your political weight behind this
thing that might pay-off, but for the moment hasn't brought anything to the country
except funds that are being spent on international consultants, which is okay for the time
being but in the end, what's left for the country?"12 0
All the technical staff shares this kind of awareness-that without financing of projects
on the ground, political support could quickly vanish. Guay says "If we move slow, if we
lose momentum... I mean yeah, this is a card castle and it could fall apart and I think it
will if we don't keep the momentum going. Every minute that goes by there is a higher
chance that we see more oil exploration develop irrationally in the Congo Basin, which
we are already seeing in Lake Edward in the Virunga National Park." 121 It is the classic
Catch-22. Patrick Welby's critique, that the REDD is "very much led from the outside,
and probably not sufficiently from the inside" is almost inescapable because of the
unpredictability of Congolese politics and the complete lack of real rule by the State
through it's administrative branches. "It's a vicious circle," admits Monteils, "because we
need political support to have results, and we need results to have money, but we need
money to have political support." 2 2
For the technical staff involved in REDD+, most are young, energetic, genuinely
interested in contributing to the enhancement of people's lives in the Congo while at the
same time that they see their mission as opening up new frontiers of development. They
mirror very much the young and upcoming staff of the World Bank, described by Robert
Wade in The World Bank: It's First Half Century, who implemented the Polonoroeste
infrastructure project in Brazil, a project that initiated a massive wave of protests against
the Bank that eventually lead to the creation of environmental safeguards and metrics of
which its REDD work can be seen as the latest incarnation. Talking about Polonoroeste,
Wade writes: "Most of the people working on the core of the project were idealistic and
young (in their late twenties and early thirties). They saw themselves as innovators,
charged with taking the Bank into the unknown problem areas of environmental
projection, indigenous people, and appropriate agricultural methods in tropical
rainforests." 2 3 This describes to an incredible extent the expatriate staff in Kinshasa
working on REDD+.
120 Interview CC-024.
121 Interview CC-002.
m Interview CC-024.
123 Wade, Robert. "Greening the Bank" from Volume 2 of The World Bank: It's First Half Century, ed.
Devesh Kapur et al. (Washington DC, The Brookings Institute Press, 1997), p641.
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The State's Position within the Global Politics of Climate
In her article on the politics of global ivory trade and the African Elephant, Charis
Thompson analyzes how perceptions and management of the African elephant evolved
over the course of 20 years of international negotiations, and how this evolution
broadened the perspective of species protection to also include concepts of social justice.
Thompson tracks how the "counting" of elephants-which established the scientific basis
of elephant's "endangerment"-became a point of contention between different groups of
scientists who politicized the matter through the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES). Simultaneously, this argument about correct methods of
counting came at the same time as the costs for protecting growing elephant populations
in National Parks throughout Africa was being increasingly borne by local communities.
What began in the late 1970s as a campaign by Western conservationists and NGOs to
define and protect a "universally" endangered elephant morphed in the late 1990s,
through the increasing engagement of local African wildlife management authorities in
CITES into a forum to discuss joint management of multiple elephant populations which
live in friction with local communities. Thompson considers this political shift as pivotal
in the scientific re-description of the African elephant, a creature that belonged to various
sub-populations, an "indigenized" elephant which could be managed "in line with
African regional and local perceptions about development, land use, wildlife and local
people," instead of through a carte blanche ban on all ivory sales, which was traditionally
favored by most Western organizations.124
This redefinition of the elephant from a universally protected species into differentiated
populations who could be acceptably managed (according to all members of the CITES
conference) through separate management practices is a clear case of how institutions
(such as conservation biology) and scientific facts (such as endangerment) change
together. For Thompson, the conclusion suggests two things: that bureaucratic, technical
and institutional capacity are crucial in "temporarily stabilizing" perceptions or
definitions of scientific artifacts so that new work can be done on them; and additionally,
that "with careful attention to these processes [of stabilization], broad gains in both
conservation and social justice should be possible."125
This case of carbon management in the DRC offers a corollary study of an effort to
"universalize" the entity of carbon found in forests through the international politics of
UNFCCC. But at the same time, UN-REDD and the World Bank FCPF have tried to
build "indigenization" of carbon into the initial regulatory design of REDD from the
beginning. The CN-REDD represents this hybrid, bureaucratic body that drives capacity
building at the same time that it calls upon the state to implement changes of its own
represents an effort to universalize and indigenize in the same gesture through a constant
idiom of participation. Talking of "unshackling" REDD, like the "African" elephant,
from a global discourse is far more problematic because of how the community of experts
framing REDD anticipated this as a problem and have designed ahead to address it. Each
national context and each R-PP and FIP Investment Plan is different and tailored to the
124 Thompson, Charis, "Co-producing CITES and the African elephant" States ofKnowledge: The Co-
production of Science and Social Order, ed. Sheila Jasanoff, (London: Routledge, 2004), p6 7 .
125 Ibid, p83.
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specifics of the country where the work is happening. Is this a conscious move of "co-
production" or a move to preempt the loss control by international actors of a policy
initiative intended for implementation across a former colonial territory?
The expatriate bureaucrats are trying to enact two simultaneous translations. The first
translation involves a complicated process in which they engage with Congolese staff to
"indigenize" the emerging international standards governing forest carbon market rules to
"fit" the Congo context; and at the same time they are trying to find as many hooks as
possible to make this funding initiative operational and implementable by those who
actually depend on the forest, without having any deep connection themselves to the
ground. They are trying to speak in at least two different directions at once, one back up
toward the international community from the voice of the state, and the other down to the
farmers and land users also from the voice of the state. The CN-REDD allows the
international community to broadcast the REDD+ agenda as an act of ventriloquism.
REDD+ attempts to do what the Thompson sees as a necessary step, which is build
bureaucratic and technical capacity; Welby might disagree that REDD+ is actually doing
this, but it's doing it better than most development projects. Even if it is just to create a
new cadre within the Ministry of Environment. The CN-REDD itself is one of the core
places where we can see the idiom of state making taking place. But we need to look
more closely as well as the tasks and administrative impact that the CN-REDD aims to
have on the broader functioning of resource management and the forestry sector in the
DRC through the design of REDD+. Going back to Becker's dictum of "following the
actions and processes," not just the people, I want to focus now on the Forest Investment
Program: An investment fund targeting small to medium scale enterprise creation in order
to replace current supply streams of forest products, thus relieving pressure on the forest.
The following analysis is intended to track how this Investment Plan attempts to take into
account previous and existing institutional discourses, identities and representations of
use of forests and realign/remap them around the issue of carbon. Of special interest is
how this tool is and is not engaging with informal forest institutions, such as customary
rule, which are far more functional in Africa than formal ones. The carbon management
tool that will form the backbone of the second empirical chapter is designed to address
the absence of administrative control through "performance-based" payments. By
attaching incoming financing to actual deforestation and carbon sequestration results, the
hope is that the political elite will be disciplined into actually supporting the creation of a
bureaucracy and expertise that is not entirely dependent on the enveloppe system, but
resembles more an operating Weberian institution.
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Chapter Four:
Investing in the Carbon Forest
If the CN-REDD is the administrative heart of REDD planning within the DRC, the
World Bank's Forest Investment Program (FIP) is that first injection of on the ground
financing that is intended to makes it tick. The FIP and the Congolese investment plan are
the capital structure, which sets up the feedback mechanism - performance-based
payments - that will keep the creature moving. The performance metric is not the growth
of corporate stock value, but growth or maintenance of forest carbon stocks. Although
not as tightly pegged to evaluating performance as the carbon metric, there is also a push
by indigenous and forest peoples groups in REDD+ negotiations to base performance on
a wider suite of metrics that include community "livelihood" improvements. Rural
institutions in the DRC operate in an incredibly informal and disaggregated fashion. Can
greater social cohesion, which many consider a pre-requisite for developmental
momentum be generated by small-scale investments intended to reduce pressure on forest
resources? This chapter explores the design assumptions within the FIP proposal and
teases out the division of labor between the administrative unit and this embryonic
financial structure in achieving a "state" of REDD+ readiness in the DRC.
Cities Eat Forests
"You need to think twice before you invest in the forest," Bruno Guay tells me as we're
standing in the hallway of the National Coordination, looking at a map of timber
concessions recently approved by the Congolese Ministry of Environment. "Investments
in the forest "might lead to counter productive results, because if you promote
development in the forest, you attract people. This is what we see in the logging
companies. They have 250-300 employees, and yet you have thousands of people who
flock to these areas to live off the little money that's there because it's the only money
out there."126 Guay is one of the technical staff hired by the United Nations Development
Program to assist the Congo develop their national REDD strategy. A week later, over
lunch, Guay utters a completely different idea: "Maybe the reason why REDD makes
sense in the Congo is because there aren't a lot of roads or infrastructure built already, so
it might be the best place to actually make this whole scheme work." 2 7 The tension that
the technical staff of the CN-REDD feel in their approach to designing DRC's REDD
strategy is inherent in the tensions of attempting to promote development in a complex
environment like the DRC. No one really knows what will work.
One of the financing tools in the bid to reduce deforestation and degradation of forests in
the DRC is the Forest Investment Plan (FIP). As we will see shortly, the FIP is being
structured to pursue Bruno Guay's first conception of carbon development in the Congo -
126 Interview CC-002.
127 Conversation w/Bruno Guay, 5/6/11. Guay's underlying point here is about "opportunity cost". Without
already imbedded infrastructure, both timber companies and industrial plantations face larger capital costs
to get involved in forest and land exploitation, so they have a higher opportunity cost of operating in the
Congo than they might say, in the Amazon or Malaysian forests. This, at least momentarily, might give an
advantage to a system such as REDD that encourages alternative values of the forest that don't depend on
large infrastructure investments.
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injecting capital on the outskirts of cities, in order to draw pressure (and potentially
people) away from the forests.
In June, 2010 the DRC was selected to participate as a member of the Bank's initial FIP
countries, making it one of eight countries eligible for funding from the Strategic Climate
Fund initially set up after Bali by donor countries (see above).128 While I was in
Kinshasa, the FIP sub-committee debated and approved the DRC's "Investment Plan,"
for roughly $60 million over five years to reduce emissions from deforestation and
degradation. Like many World Bank managed funds directed at the group of Lease
Developed Countries, the FIP is not a loan, but aid money. But somewhat uniquely, FIP
aid will create a nationally managed fund that oversees and distributes grants and small
loans to in-country projects designated through its investment plan. In the DRC, these
funds are directed to achieve two goals: 1) create reductions in forest-related carbon
emissions, and 2) generate incentives for entrepreneurs and income opportunities for
local Congolese. A small group within the CN-REDD is in charge of designing the plan
and is jointly managed by the United Nations Development Program attache Bruno Hugel
and his Congolese counterpart in the Ministry of Environment Kamathe Kabengele, a
former lecturer at University of Kinshasa. Their work serves as one of the principle
activities through which the institutional mechanisms of REDD+ are structuring the
Congolese state.
The flexibility of the overall FIP approach allows each of the initial eight countries to
design a portfolio of investments that target the particular drivers and determinants of
deforestation and degradation in their given country. Unlike Brazil, Mexico or Indonesia,
the current drivers of deforestation in the Democratic Republic of Congo are not
industrial agriculture and large-scale timber operations. They are preponderantly linked
to local land use practices, particularly subsistence agriculture, artisanal logging and
charcoal production for local and regional consumption.129 Logically, a strategy to reduce
deforestation in the DRC would target these elements and this is precisely what has
framed the approach of the CN-REDD designers of the DRC FIP Investment Plan. The
DRC Plan focuses on a portfolio of micro-economic investments particularly intended to
augment alternative supplies of fuel wood through the creation of local reforestation
businesses, investments in improved cook stoves (ideally manufactured in country) and
the launch of a major community forestry initiative. Investments in improved rural
agriculture techniques make up an entirely separate stream of REDD investments that are
being funneled through the eight national pilot projects funded by the Congo Basin Forest
Fund (CBFF). (These Pilot Projects represent the second vision of REDD+ announced
by Guay above--as development investments in local forest communities--and deserve
their own chapter but are not covered in this thesis for lack of time and space.)
Energy in the DRC is inexorably linked to the forest. The population of the DRC relies
128 The eight initial FIP countries are Brazil, Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana,
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Mexico, Peru.
129 See De Wasseige, 2009...
130 The Congo Basin Forest Fund is a jointly managed bi-lateral fund of the United Kingdom Department
for International Development (DFID) and Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD).
56
on 90% of its fuel from wood and charcoal, and the principle investments of the FIP
target agroforestry projects on the outskirts of large urban areas that grow acacia or other
wood for charcoal production as well as investments in community managed forests and
cook stoves that burn more efficiently. The market for fuel wood exists in every
community in the Congo, but it is strongly concentrated in urban areas, which is why FIP
funds are primarily targeting the provisioning hinterlands of three large population
centers. These include the regional market around the capital of Kinshasa; the supply area
around Kisangani, a large town on the Congo River in the northeastern province of
Orientale; and the densely settled area located between the cities of Kanaga and Mbuji-
Mayi in the south [see map below].
Pority intervention
areas proposed
for teFIP
iK an ga
Ctheinest Inften river one deforvention fnocused arond thy o red ran ahresofsesa
causing deforestation away from the forests and toward the savanna zone." 32 It,'s a small
sentence, with significant implications for local livelihoods: make investments that draw
people away from the forest to save it.
The bulk of carbon in the DRC, roughly 40 gigatons according to most estimatesm, is
locked up in its dense humid rainforests, so slowing down the conversion of these areas,
13 Map taken from Ministry of Environment, Conservation of Nature and Tourism DRC FIP Investment
Plan, 2011, p4 3 .SIbid, p1 R1.
13 Summarized in McKinsey Company report, "Potential REDD+ de la RDC," Ministry of Environment,
Conservation of Nature and Tourism, December 2009
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is the priority for the FIP. Land cover change maps of the DRC show that the bulk of the
land change happens at the edge of human settlements. In the case of the large urban
areas, this edge is incredibly difficult to locate. The supply chains of fuel provisioning for
Kinshasa extend well up into the Central Congo Basin, hundreds of miles away from the
city. In the city of Bikoro, for instance, a small town located on Lake Tumba 550 miles
upriver from Kinshasa, charcoal production destined for the capital is a major source of
income for local townspeople. Transport costs are the major obstacle to getting any goods
to market in the DRC, but ever since the Lebanese timber company ITB moved to Bikoro
in 2002 to exploit a government granted timber concession (one of the 65 approved in the
MECNT's legal review), they have helped catalyze a booming charcoal business that is
having rapid impacts on the surrounding forests. The company, which ships large barges
of timber a few times of year to Kinshasa allows locals to market their charcoal via ITB's
boats. Previously, shipping costs were too high to make charcoal production lucrative
except for the local market. But now, traveling through Bikoro, nearly every home has
become a small-scale charcoal producer.
Rows and rows of those synthetic white
rice sacks that seem ubiquitous throughout
Africa lean against huts and homes in the
streets of Bikoro, each stuffed as high as a
man with charcoal. The pervasiveness of
this local boom in charcoal production was
evident on a visit to the home and office of
the territorial administrator, whose yard
and outbuilding had been turned into a mini
charcoal processing plant with an entire
room filled with un-sifted charcoal and two
separate rooms where sacks were first
filled, and then "topped-off' and capped
with a woven net of branches and leaves
that allowed the rice sacks to be filled to
capacity.
Altering this dynamic is the central
experiment of the FIP, which is why over half of the entire portfolio of investment plan
($30.3 million) is dedicated to direct investments in the biomass energy supply chain,
particularly in reforestation projects modeled on the first Congolese CDM project called
Ibi Bateke, which replanted large nearly 4,000ha of "degraded" lands on the Bateke
Plateau outside Kinshasa with different species of acacia destined to be turned into
charcoal for consumption in Kinshasa. Creating projects that reduce demand for primary
forest charcoal makes obvious sense, but in conversations I had, there was little
discussion of among CN-REDD planners about what happens to communities such as
Bikoro should the "relocalizing" of charcoal production around Kinshasa prove effective,
and the bottom drop out of the market for distant charcoal producers.
In addition to selecting investments that will transform supply chains and production
systems within the three geographically defined areas, the CN-REDD team also identified
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a separate set of investments that they deem crucial to unleashing the benefits of carbon-
conscious capital. These include investments targeted at modernizing the country's land
management laws and institutions - land use planning (i.e. zoning), land tenure and the
implementation of a community land management model.
In order to better analyze these two dynamics of the FIP-the measurement and selection
of "results-based" carbon activities and the implementation of legal reforms deemed
necessary to achieve carbon reductions-I am going to look closely at the FIP
investments plans for community managed forestry. Community forestry is the second
largest sectoral component in the FIP, and it provides a particularly appropriate window
through which to observe the co-production of the Congolese state and the anchoring of
carbon within a particular social formation that links self-determination with sustainable
resource management. In this sense, community forestry is at once a carbon reduction
technology and a formalized social entity.
This greening of state building in the DRC, which community forestry performs, rests on
two distinct developmental features of the FIP:
1) FIP funds explicitly serve to bridge "readiness" planning to "performance-based
payment" activities. This represents a paradigm shift in resource development in
which flows of carbon serves as proxy for measuring success of aid money.
2) Carbon financing from the FIP targets not just the underlying drivers and
determinants of deforestation and degradation, but also targets the political
economy that constrains alternative activities. In the DRC, this puts into play
certain political categories such as community.
Performance-based Development
The emphasis in REDD+ on "performance-based payments" reflects a small revolution
within the field of development metrics and evaluation. Revisiting Andrew Steers' quote
from earlier, "Performance-based payments are the game changer in the global efforts to
reduce tropical deforestation and forest degradation." 34 Indeed, measuring performance
is one of the greatest challenges of development aid programs. This is true especially of
programs in the field of health, agriculture, education, food security and environment.
Other sectors of development have begun implementing "performance-based payments".
A food aid program in Mexico, for instance, makes delivery of aid contingent on families
sending their children to school. School attendance records become the performance-
based metric for payments. Take your child out of school and lose the aid. The link
between lack of education and need for children to work long hours either collecting
water or growing crops is thoroughly documented, but it is difficult to compel parents to
keep children in school when the family as a whole might yield short-term benefits by
having them available to work. There is a growing literature of "performance-based"
development, and it has been an increasing interest of large aid agencies such as the
Millennium Development Corporation and experimental design driven development
134 Andrew Steers, the World Bank's Special Envoy for Climate, quoted in a Press Release from the
Norwegian Royal Ministry of Environment at the announcement of Norway's commitment of $50 million
to the Carbon Fund of the FCPF, 06/21/2011.
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emphasized by groups such as the Poverty Action Lab at MIT.
This is part of the promise of REDD+ within the rural development and natural resource
management community: it provides a metric of performance - the increased and
continuing sequestration of carbon, represented by the proxies of forest cover and
increased biomass - that gives a clear signal as to whether investments and policies are
making a difference. This accumulation of carbon stock is only sustainable through long-
term investments that address current drivers and determinants of deforestation and
degradation. And, so the REDD+ storyline goes, this performance is increasingly cheap
to measure (thanks to emerging remote sensing technology) and increasingly possible to
link causally to REDD investments (thanks to national level strategies and forest
governance reforms that target the issues of leakage and permanence and additionally).
According to Guay, creating a measurable system of performance will allow donor
countries to be more decisive in their investments, and hold developing countries
accountable for the progress of REDD programs. "Sustainable forest management.
Reforestation. A lot of this has been done before in a lot of places. The new element now
is a results-based mechanism with standards and clear metrics. We've never had these
metrics. Look at all the UN programs. There is no one doing anything like the kind of
monitoring, reporting and verification like we're planning for carbon. There's nothing
like that. They just do these programs and spend millions and millions of dollars and they
don't really look at the results. They don't. And that's standard UNDP procedure to not
really look at the results. It's the same with the World Bank and all these projects, they
are not results oriented, they are process oriented." 135
Accountability is qualitatively good thing to promote in development, as a means of
combating corruption and service delivery failure but it depends how accountability is
structured, who is accountable to whom and how much of a role the "performer" has in
shaping the metrics of performance. This is difficult to untangle, but with the
implementation of the FIP, the idea of accountability of performance can be seen as
processual (there are stages where a country such as the DRC moves from country
experiments to results to actual performance based payments). The UN and Bank are
clearly not "accountable" to how their planning might affect charcoal makers in Bikoro,
but there is a heavy emphasis in the overall REDD strategy process in the DRC (and
globally) to develop livelihood improvement metrics that would serve as a secondary
performance criteria to determine whether REDD+ financing was delivering or not on its
promises. The development of these metrics is dragging behind the rest of the process,
but a number of groups from UN-REDD to the Rainforest Foundation Norway to the
Woods Hole Research Center are trying to figure out through interactions and dialogues
with villagers how to include social impact assessment metrics in REDD+ design. For the
purposes of the Bank and the FIP, it is not clear at all how these social metrics will play a
role in any "results-based" or performance based investment regime. "The FIP
Investment Plan," according to the FIP Plan itself, "can be seen as an attempt to form a
link between REDD Preparation and future performance-based payments for Emission
13s Interview CC-002.
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Reductions."136 As of yet, there is not an "and Livelihood Improvements" addendum to
the notion of performance.
The World Bank staffer working most closely on the Congolese carbon market design is
a young Brazilian named Andre Aquino, based in Kinshasa. Part of both the Bank's
Environment Division and the Carbon Finance Unit he had been in Kinshasa for nearly
two years when I met him, and he told me that his presence in the Congo indicated the
Bank's commitment and crucial role in carrying out REDD in the Congo.1 37 An amateur
linguist who speaks over seven languages, Andre hosted me in his apartment for a couple
weeks while I was working in Kinshasa. Despite sharing an apartment, I rarely saw him
because, like much of the multi-lateral attaches, he was frequently not in Kinshasa,
traveling to Barcelona, Bonn, and Brazzaville to carbon conferences and workshops in
the few weeks I intersected with him in the Congo. I interviewed him in the DRC shortly
before he took a morning flight to Maputo, where he was helping the government of
Mozambique begin their REDD+ preparedness planning. The following section focuses
on the FIP process, particularly it's role as a demonstration tool that "reveals" carbon
reduction results that could then be compensated for in a performance-based system:
Interviewer: So FIP is results base; so it's prior to doing something that's
performance-payment based?
Aquino: FIP is not results based. FIP aims to achieve results, but FIP is before
that. FIP is just investments. Like a regular World Bank intervention or any
bilateral.
Interviewer: But you aren't expecting any return on these investments, right?
Aquino: No. We are expecting that the activities will lead to reducing
deforestation. But the FIP will not buy these, or compensate for these reductions
[beyond the initial investments].
Interviewer: They won't even really be accounted for, right?
Aquino: No they will. That's something we need to do.
Interviewer: So if I go to this document: Table ofAllocation of FIP
Resources...m
Many of my interviews while in the DRC, revolved around moments of looking at
documents, maps and spreadsheets. The phase of REDD+ planning within the Ministry of
Environment was largely on paper and debated in the tight offices of the CN-REDD, on
the phone with bankers from BNP Paribas, or at conference tables with sub-committees
composed of international development bank staff, civil society NGOs, and members of
bi-lateral aid offices. Here, in my conversation with Aquino, I pulled up a spreadsheet
137 Out of the 60 odd staff of the World Bank's Carbon Finance Unit, Aquino was the only one in the
"field" for two years. The Bank recently sent a full time staffer from the CFU to Indonesia to implement
and monitor FCPF and FIP investments.
138 Interview CC-027.
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that one of the CN-REDD staffers, Stephan Salim, a French agronomy engineer, had
assembled on the portfolio of FIP's carbon investments. It was an Excel document
itemizing every budget expenditure in the FIP Investment Plan and the expected emission
reductions connected to the expenditure. The version that Aquino and I looked at in our
conversation was not the final version, nor was this version made public, but this moment
is illustrative, so I've extracted a couple images from the document to help anchor the
following comments.
Table 1 below shows the summary page of the Excel workbook called "Table of
Allocation for FIP Resources _v8-3", where each targeted area of carbon reduction
investments is represented as a line item in the FIP budget.139
Table 1. FIP Overall Investment Portfolio4 0
In the Excel workbook, this summary page is contained on the first tab of the workbook,
and the subsequent tabs of the workbook are devoted to providing more details on each
investment "Component" (i.e. Enabling activities, Land Tenure Reform, Improved
Charcoal Production, etc). In the last column of the table are the expected "sequestered or
avoided emissions of carbon" for each investment. Only the sectoral activities have any
estimates of emission related "results", which, over 5 years of investments should yield a
total of 10,495,704 tons of emission savings. Agroforestry, afforestation and reforestation
are expected to generate the lions share of these avoided emissions, with community
managed forests and natural generation making up a distant second and third.
Let me take up again where the conversation broke off with Aquino:
139 The budget in this version of the Excel spreadsheet is shown as $54 million; the final Investment Plan
budget is actually $58.4 million, but the differences in the broader plan are minimal from this earlier
version.
140 Original descriptions were in French; English translations are my own, with the French removed to save
space.
62
Interviewer: So ifI go to this document. Table ofAllocation of FIP Resources...
Aquino: Go back to the "Foret Communitaires" [Community Forests], for an
instance. You see that here we tried to calculate how much carbon we are going
to reduce, this will need to be accounted. [Aquino and I are looking at tab on the
excel sheet called "Forest Com"; short for "Foret Communitaires", which
includes the tables below].
Interviewer: How were these numbers generated?
Aquino: This is actually something that I did. Stephan put these numbers in the
table, but I did this and can explain the reasoning there. Basically, we are
saying how many hectares will be put under management, and how by putting
these hectares under commutity management, and helping communities really
manage these we will be able to reduce deforestation and then we say how much
reductions in deforestation we will be able to achieve by year; so first year
nothing because we haven't started yet, second year 10, 20, 40 and 40%
reductions. So of course, these are assumptions, not even based on what's there.
This is me, I just came up with this, based kind of on other experiences, but I
find them, extremely... optimistic. But we want good numbers here.'4 '
Project
Zone 1:
Kinshasa
Project
Zone 2:
Kananga/ 0% 10% 20% 40% 40% 0 87 174 349 349 958 95,838 351,407
Mbuji
Mayi
Project
Zone 3: 0% 10% 20% 40% 40% 0 88 176 351 351 966 96,577 354,117
Kisangani
b ~ ~ E1tj V
The numbers Aquino is referring to are broken into estimates of percentages and actual
hectares of forest that will not be cut down over five years as a result of a community
getting concessionary control of their forests. The forest concession is then converted into
a value of carbon according to some estimate of uniform biomass, which is then
converted into avoided emissions in the last column on the right: 862,327 avoided tons of
C02.
IG: So, this is optimistic, generated maybe from Brazil's experience?
AA: NO. Don't try to understand this; we really needed to do something with numbers,
but I don't think we can ever find... the experience with community forestry has had
141 Interview CC-027.
10% 20%0% 40% 40% 0 39 78 156 156 428 42,764 156,803
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extremely mixed results. In some places it's been very good; in Brazil, in Mexico, in
Bolivia, for instance. It's the main form of management that protects forests, like
indigenous people areas, like in Brazil. But in Africa we have a much more mixed track
record. In Tanzania it's worked a little bit, in Madagascar not so much; in the Congo
Basin the only country with real experience is Cameroon and it's not good.4 2
Project Zone 1
Kinshasa 1,381,306 50,000 0.78% 389
Project Zone 2: Kananga 4,033,829 150,000 0.58% 871/ Mbuji Mayi
Project Zone 3: 5,135,838 200,000 0.44% 878
K i s a n g a n iIIIII
These are the spreadsheets that are proposing to subtly reshape Congo's landscape. My
conversation with Aquino is worth highlighting because it captures the processual fixing
of emission "results" in the DRC. The scope of the suggested interventions above are not
grand - 400,000 hectares is a drop in the bucket of the overall DRC forest reserve - but
there are some fascinating political games and intellectual assumptions at work in
proposing community managed forests as a part of the overall investment plan to reduce
forest carbon emissions.
Community Operator
Community Managed Forests currently do not exist as a legal entity in the DRC and their
inclusion in the FIP is a subtle way of pressuring the government to proceed with issuing
a law on community managed forestry, something long sought by Congolese civil society
and indigenous rights groups, and something which has increased community autonomy
in many parts of Southeast Asia and South America. The main intellectual assumption,
which Aquino acknowledges, is based on a few decades of development and economics
literature, which suggests that devolving management of resources to local communities
increases the sustainable stewardship of local resources. Yet definitive evidence that
stewardship of resources by local populations necessarily yields environmental results
sought by projects such as REDD is incredibly mixed across different regions of the
globe, with particularly dismal results in Africa.
Outside developing country contexts, the assumption that localizing management
decisions fosters good resource stewardship is equally fraught and trends against a whole
literature of the "tragedy of the commons". This is visible, for instance, in the
radicalization of local land use decision-making brought about by the "wise use"
movements in the Western United States. The movement, echoing the arguments of
community stewardship, suggests that local populations are best situated to determine
how adjacent resources should be used, and that their use will inevitably be in the interest
of the larger public. In many instances, authorizing local control over "public lands" in
142 Ibid
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the U.S. would be to the detriment of larger public goals such as the reintroduction of
wolves in the Rocky Mountains or travel plans on public lands that prevent people from
driving motorized vehicles wherever they want. While few developing countries, if any,
are dealing with the obsessive traditions of private property and conflicts between state
rights and federalism exhibited in the U.S., local resources nonetheless share this
common feature: they serve as a complex matrix around, and for, which springs political
action.
In the case of Community Managed Forests, this is not to argue that there are not entirely
separate social benefits related to the goals of democratic governance and self-
determination in decentralizing land use decisions. Arun Agrawal documents how
governance is made both more efficient, more localized, as well as more invasive and
disciplining in India when the central authority granted local communities early 2 0 th
century the right to police public forests themselves by granting them forest concessions
with explicit stewardship rules.143 But from the perspective of conservation there are
reasons to avoid quick comparison between countries. The one longstanding example of
community-managed forestry in Sub-Saharan Africa is in Cameroon, where, following
World Bank initiated reforms of the forestry sector similar to those enacted in the Congo,
the government institutionalized community forestry in 1994. So far, the experiment has
not been positive either for communities or for the integrity of forests. The creation of a
new class of community forest concessions has allowed corrupt Cameroonian forestry
officials to build relations with local elites and increase illegal resource extraction from
"community forests" by issuing concession titles that are not tightly bound to actual
communities.144 Not only is community forestry not yielding more sustainable forest use
in Cameroon, it is also thwarting the equity goals of community forestry champions.
There is perhaps even a more fundamental problem with community forestry in a place
such as Africa, which has to do with the very concept of "community" and the effort to
make it operational across vastly different places of the globe. In the Cameroonian
context, according to political economist Alain Karsenty, the politics of resource use "are
not necessarily visible to the casual observer and may actually be considerably more
complex than the term 'community' suggests. First the 'community concept' seems to be
difficult to operationalize given that its two underlying assumptions - as stable, coherent
entity and clear boundaries - do not readily apply to rural populations [in Africa]." 14 5
Karsenty continues with the consideration that "the term 'village communities' in an
African context camouflages a situation in which land and resources are appropriated by
family groups of various sizes and composition. From a historical viewpoint, many of the
villages that observers now call 'communities' were created by colonial governments
who settled people along roads in order to control them more easily."146
143 See Arun Agrawal, "State Formation in Community Spaces? Decentralization of Control over Forests in
the Kumaon Himalaya, India," The Journal ofAsian Studies, Vol. 60, No. 1, 2001, 9-40.
44 See Alan Karsenty, "The New Economic 'Great Game' in Africa and the Future of Governance Reforms
in the Forest Sectors", in Governing Africa 's Forests in a Globalized World, ed. Laura German et al.,
Center for International Forestry Research, 2010.
146 Ibid, p89.
146 Ibid
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This observation is distinctly true of the forest area in Equateur where I spent six weeks.
The road connecting Mbandaka to Bikoro, a 100km stretch of beaten earth, was built in
1952 by the Belgian colonialists who hoped to sprout cacao and rubber plantations along
its length. According to elders of one of Buya I, a village where I spent a great deal of my
time, nearly all the villages in the area were physically relocated by the Belgian colonial
police-the Force Publique-to assist in the construction of the road. Since1950 the
villages are now all located along the road, but the resettlement did not necessarily
respect traditional roles of power within the villages and it is not difficult to imagine that
the rearrangements of land ownership accompanying these displacements are still felt
today among villagers.
Our tenuous grasp on the ontology of community in the Congolese context also relates to
the history of how former colonizers related and established relations between local
authorities and the colonial state. Traditional authority in most villages in the DRC is
based on the concept of customary chiefdoms. In an effort to legitimize colonial rule (and
facilitate their continued extraction of ivory and rubber from the basin), the Belgians
instituted "associative" rule where they split authority at the local level between civil
authority (the state) and customary authority (traditional rule). Associative rule,
according to African scholar Mahmood Mamdani, "reorganized colonial power as two
distinct authorities, each ruling through different legal regimes, one civic and the other
ethnic."147 Civil law applied only to Belgians, whereas colonial administrators wrote up
an entirely different set of laws for ethnic communities organized as Native Authorities.
Administrators, instead of drafting a single, coherent set of customary laws for all "native
authorities" tailored specific laws to each ethnic group. When the Belgians departed in
1960, Zaire (and now the DRC) extended civil law to every citizen of the Congo,
granting them equal political and individual rights, and even though they abolished the
"native authorities", they "continued to reproduce the native identity as ethnic" by
granting resource control to those with ancestral claims to the land. In other words,
customary rule, enshrined in Congolese law provides access to deciding who does and
who does not get to farm a particular plot of the forest. "Herein," says Mamdani, "lies the
material basis of ethnic belonging, particularly for the ethnic poor."1 48 The harmonious
"community" REDD+ is trying to operationalize through laws on community forestry, as
a means for achieving both carbon reduction results and livelihood improvements,
revives this problematic of ethnic citizenship. Only those family groups recognized by
the customary authority as "having rights" (the ayants droits in French) get to exercise
restriction and access to the forest. Trying to formalize "communities" through a
community forestry law risks exacerbating latent ethnic tensions.
Leaving aside the troubled ontology of community and its ability to stably perform the
reduction of carbon emissions for the moment, there is the problematic fact that, in the
Democratic Republic of Congo community managed forests, or Forets aux Communautes
Locales, do not yet exist. The Ministry of Environment, while I was in the Congo, had
draft forms of both a Ministerial decree (called a d&ret, in French) and a Ministerial
directive (called an arrdtd, in French) written and sitting on the desk of the Prime
147 Mamdani, 1999, p53.
148 Ibid, p55.
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Minister waiting to be signed to make this administrative creature law. The following is a
political analysis of the Congolese Forets aux Communautes Locales (FCL) and why
carbon finance benefits invoke this non-existent legal creature that seems to be a thorn in
the side of the State.
FIP and the Reform of the State
The Forest Code of 2002, a sweeping, World Bank-backed reform of the Congolese
forestry sector, calls in Article 22 for the creation of Forets aux Communautes Locales
(FCL)'49 . In essence, the FCL gives communities the legal basis to receive a concession
title to their customary forestlands. The Code serves as a set of guiding principles and
directives, which the Ministry of Environment is tasked with implementing through
additional ddcrets and arrdtds. In the draft d cret for the FCL, the definition of local
community is given as "A population traditionally organized around a similar base of
customs and united by clan or family lineage that produce an internal cohesion. Local
Communities are characterized, otherwise, by their attachment to a specific piece of
territory." This adds the "territorial community" to the notion of "ethnic community"
theorized by Mamdani. At the same time, Article 7 mentions, "At the offices of the sector
chief, there is a registry of local communities. The legal identity of a local community is
confirmed by its inscription in the registry." 50 A local community, for the purposes of
the FCL, is both a customary collective (ethnic and/or territorial) and an administrative
entity subordinate to the next administrative jurisdiction, the Secteur. So with the dccret,
we have the rules governing how the FCL fits into the jurisdictional and customary
landscapes.
The arrtd on the FCL covers implementation of community forests at the local level and
outlines the creation of a three-part governing structure to oversee the management of the
forest concession: a Community Assembly (deliberative body), a Council of Elders
(customary council w/consultative powers), and a Management Committee (executive
body). The community assembly is tasked with defining community members, creating
bylaws for how the assembly will operate, establishing boundaries of the concession,
assuming juridical responsibilities, drafting a local plan of development and creating a
Community Development Fund where revenues from commercial activities in the FCL
will be kept. The ddcret establishes that in order to be officially recognized, the FCL
must be reviewed by the local administration charged with forests, under the chef de
secteur. This review cannot last more than a month and the recommendation of the chef
de secteur is submitted to the Governor of the Province for determination. A Community
Forest Concession can be granted on land that is no larger than 50,000 ha. Ultimately,
communities can freely acquire these concessions (following micro-zoning exercises and
consultation with neighboring communities on village boundaries, which require upfront
investment), which give them a range of development options, including sustainable
timber contracts with small-scale loggers or contracts that monetize climate benefits of
their forests. The FCL gives villages title to their own lands and is intended to provide
means for local development.
14 DRC Law 011/2002 of August 29, 2002, supporting Forestry Code, articles 22.
150 Draft d&ret of Foret aux Communaute Locale, 5/16/2011.
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The reasons that the FCL has not been signed into law are not completely transparent, but
Bruno Hugel of the CN-REDD hypothesized in conversation with me at the UNFCCC
climate conference in Durban, South Africa, that the decret and arrtd were both written
before REDD planning started in the Congo and that the original texts are not up to the
task of facilitating linkages between communities and REDD projects. He also mentioned
that the government was dissatisfied with how they negotiated the texts with civil society,
and the lack of language in the drafts regarding how a community might lose its
privileges if it abused the concession in any way. The passage of the FCL is a prime issue
of politics between groups in the Congo supporting further decentralization and self-
determination and those in the Ministry of Environment that are uneasy with reforms that
do not obviously benefit the state or those within the state.
The FIP Investment Plan has, perhaps paradoxically, become a central tool for advancing
community-managed forests. Avoided deforestation estimates based on other experiences
of community managed forests in Brazil, Bolivia and Mexico do not just play a role in
creating a sense of actual emissions management that may or may not correspond to
measurable results, they also speak across ideological gaps and bring inside the house of
carbon those interested in an entirely different, and potentially contradictory, normative
agenda of community rights. The indigenous and forest people's movement has mixed
feelings about REDD. They are both suspicious and hopeful that carbon financing will
include the changes to land use rules that strengthen their political voice and grant them
more independence from the whims of the State. One of the main environmental
advocacy organizations inside the DRC is the Network of Natural Resources (RRN) 5 1 , a
national Congolese umbrella organization for regional environmental non-profits engaged
in lobbying efforts to increase participatory decision making over resources. In an
editorial from the July-August 2010 issue of their bi-monthly magazine, RRN's president
Joseph Bobia Bonkaw argues in favor of the creation of a community managed forest
law: "At this stage of debates, Civil Society wants the Ministry of Environment to sign
the pending laws on community forestry with the least possible delay so as to allow local
communities to begin requesting community forest concessions. Community concessions
provide a means of local participation in the sustainable management of forests, and
should be a reality in the DRC."is2 The intellectual assumption within the FIP is fully
operational in the discourse of RRN.
According to Anne Martinsuun, a representative of the Norwegian based non-profit forest
people's advocacy group Rainforest Foundation who are both a funder of RRN and
sitting members of the FIP sub-committee, at the last meeting of FIP countries in Cape
Town, in June of 2011, FIP donor countries criticized the Congolese government for not
having already passing the FCL. The Rainforest Foundation and their Congolese allies
were involved in the drafting of the original texts, and they staunchly protested revisions
initially made by the government. Staff from the CN-REDD told me privately that they
151 Network of Natural Resources in the French is Reseau de Resource Naturels, thus RRN.
1 Joseph Bobia Bonkaw, President of the RRN, Editorial "Dialogue permanent pour aider les decideuers a
percevoir ce que veulent effectivement les communautes locales et peoples autochtones" in the July-August
2010 no. 9 issue of Resources Naturelles, a bi-monthly magazine of the RRN; p 3; translation from French
is the my own.
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think the final adoption of the Investment Plan may hang ultimately on whether FCL does
or does not exist, because it has become the most tangible gain that civil society in the
Congo is asking for within the broader carbon financing agenda - a localized and modest
version of actual land tenure reform. Their agenda in this case fits well with the need of
the World Bank for demonstrated inclusion and participation by civil society in the FIP
planning process. Counting carbon requires the same approach of participation that the
Bank has mastered over the last couple decades and the FIP is making use of numerous
forms of participation to legitimize itself, but changing the laws of the country to allow
participation of communities in the legal titling of their customary lands is perhaps the
most immediate and large-scale participation they are leveraging, offering nearly $100
million in exchange for the reform.
And yet there may be even more macroscopic reasons for the lack of getting the FCL
passed and more concrete reasons as to why perhaps $100 million is not enough to turn
the heads of those in power. Alain Karsenty, a close analyst of resource governance in the
Congo Basin writes in a recent article regarding community forestry that foreign direct
investment in land maybe giving central states second thoughts on decentralizing
authority to communities. "We can hypothesize that the growing competition for
forestlands of high commercial value and for the natural resources (e.g. mineral and
petroleum products buried under the forestlands) will encourage governments to
strengthen their efforts to retain stewardship of these forests rather than satisfy the rural
populations' aspirations for local control, particularly in places where the economic
stakes of forestlands are high."15 3 Given the doubts about investing in the actual forest by
UNDP staff ("I'm afraid to see deep jungle community forestry. Because that will drive
deforestation in the long run"' 54), whether the FCL comes into legal existence through the
FIP process depends a great deal on how crucial the promoters of REDD feel the
approval of civil society is for the ultimate success of REDD.
The Knowledge Bank
Back to 862,327 and the idea of performance. The immediate numbers are not something
to cling to, as Aquino himself says. They are placeholders. But we see at least
momentarily, that the combination emissions reduction results with reforms granting self-
determination of resource use requires that the empirics of Brazil, Mexico and Bolivia
community forests become stand-ins for the forest communities in the Congo. This,
indeed, is standard practice for the Bank, whose knowledge practices are mobilized to
make equivalencies and commensuration between disparate lands and cultures.
According to the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility public document, "Knowledge
management (KM) - the systematic organization and dissemination of knowledge for a
set of stated objectives - is a key component of the FCPF... both the FCPF's initial
implementation in the first REDD Country Participants and its long-term success strongly
depend on the creative synthesis and dissemination of existing and new knowledge on
best practices to reduce the rate of deforestation and forest degradation." 5 5 These
expected carbon reductions cataloged in the initial FIP budget sheets perform a potent
53 Karsenty, 2010, p8 5 .
154 Interview CC-002.
.ss FCPF 2008, p 3 7 .
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link between many different sites of previous observation and experience of forest
management-none of which are from the Congo. Bruno Latour, in his essay "Drawing
Things Together" calls this phenomenon "the cascade of ever simplified inscriptions that
allow harder facts to be produced at greater cost."156 These inscriptions and mobilizations
of experiences in completely different cultural and social settings is part of the global
machinery proposing to stabilize carbon across radically different geographies. Aquino
acknowledges all this, and yet we are moving forward with the logic of cascades upon
which other justifications can be attached. Results-based emissions, at the moment, seem
to depend on Congolese communities behaving like communities in other forested places.
How likely is it that if these experiments in community managed forestry do not
"perform" like communities elsewhere then the planners of the Bank or the UN will
revise their conception of community and its viability as a tool of carbon management? Is
it not too difficult to anticipate that perhaps a new research agenda will be opened up to
help get Congolese communities "ready" to be more like the Bolivian, Mexican and
Brazilian communities that do manage their forests while reducing deforestation.
Critiques think that linking a country such as the Congo to performance pay systems
before they've achieved more basic institutional reforms is demanding too much from a
post-conflict country with such weak governance and embedded systems of corruption.157
But carbon finance and performance payments institute the idea of a feedback for
development that is currently lacking in most aid programs. And maybe performance will
take on a particularly "Congolese" flavor, emergent from the situation itself that does not
depend on making carbon in the DRC equivalent with carbon from the Chinese
refrigerant plant or the Moldovan reforestation project. Aquino acknowledges this
possibility: "We may have these performance based payments here but we may not even
measure them by carbon, but by proxies. Such as hectares under community
management, amount of hectares reforested, number of [improved cook stoves] used by
people. Things that don't measure reduced emissions directly, but rather represent one
step back in the causal change. If you do that, we still believe that there will be emission
reductions." 158 Decoupling rigid carbon measurements may help address other underlying
challenges of resource management in the Congo. Aquino and Guay argue in a recent
paper they presented to a forest carbon conference in Freiburg, Germany that "we believe
that a national REDD+ mechanism can be implemented with a broader understanding of
'performance-based' payments, defined not strictly as measured emission
reductions...the international financing to feed the national REDD+ funds should be
conditioned on clear policy and institutional reform milestones necessary to address the
underlying causes of deforestation and forest degradation. This would include a vast
array of activities, mainly dealing with land tenure, law enforcement, and overall state
building."159
156 Latour, Bruno "Drawing Things Together," in M. Lynch and S. Woolgar, eds. Representation in
Scientific Practice (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), p40.
157 See Karsenty and Ongolo, 2011.
158 Interview CC-027.
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The Bank's engagement in carbon markets through mechanisms such as the FIP is a
continuation and expansion of the Bank's role as global "environmental knowledge"
producer par excellence and directly intervening in the architecture of the state. These
"interventions, " steered by the CN-REDD are repackaged as coming from within the
countries themselves. The founding FIP states that its goals "are to mobilize new and
additional financing for adaptation and mitigation programs to address climate change
that are country-led and designed to support sustainable development and poverty
reduction. Activities financed by the FIP should be integrated into country-owned
development strategies" 16 And again a little bit later, "FIP pilot programs should be
country-led and -owned, should build on, enhance and strengthen existing nationally
prioritized REDD efforts, and should respect national sovereignty."' 6 ' These phrases
themselves are performative, and attempt, to shift the focus away from the previous
discourse of "conditionalities" which are aligned in most country's minds with the carrots
and sticks of the Structural Adjustment Programs of the McNamara Bank era. 162 But
while "country-owned" and "performance-metrics" might be rhetorically more palatable
than "conditionalities", it does not shift the substantive relationship between aid-recipient
countries and the Bank whose employees demand "institutional reform milestones"
before REDD+ investments are actually made.
Despite the Bank's ongoing use of soft-coercion in advancing market-oriented
development tools, the FIP, by focusing on mico-scale investments does have an
opportunity in the DRC to catalyze what Hirschman called "linkages." REDD+ is
maneuvering the Ministry of Environment into this new role by turning it into a mini
development agency itself, distributing grant and loan money and investing in economic
activities that provide alternatives to deforestation or forest degradation. If successful in
launching initiatives that produce carbon-reduction results, the FIP could be scaled up at
a national level into a mechanism similar to the Amazon Fund, the Guyana Fund or the
Indonesian Fund in which bilateral donors make investments for carbon reduction results
that are not associated with CERs. For many of the technical staff involved in REDD in
the DRC, this vision of a large national REDD+ fund, catalyzing "green development"
supported by performance-based tracking systems, would be the ultimate affirmation of
their work. "My opinion about these things are that some of these [institutional] changes
require very big tradeoffs and political capital. Unless there are huge carrots, it is very
difficult. And these carrots are tied to the performance-based payments. So the big
question is can we work with partners [i.e. donors] to convince to make that available to
the DRC. That's one of my biggest concerns and something that I work on, to convince
them to put money here. We don't know that yet. There is a study on the creation of a
national REDD fund that we are financing...that's my grandiose idea is that we would
help DRC establish something on those lines."163
This shows how the CN-REDD is helping reposition the Ministry of Environment within
the government itself as a more important Ministry. One capable of generating revenues
160 FIP Design Document, 2009, p4 .
161 Ibid, p6.
162 See Nelson TE, Acker M, Melvin M. "Irrepressible stereotypes." Journal Experimental Social
Psychology 32:13-38, 1996.
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for the government not just based on timber, conservation aid or the nearly non-existent
eco-tourism dollars. But the REDD+ initiative is also helping improve the overall stature
of the country within the region as well, and this, according to Monteils has major
strategic importance: "There was maybe two or three years ago, the DRC had less
international weight in diplomatic circles on forest issues compared to a country like
Gabon. But today, with the increase in technical capacity [in the Ministry], its given far
more legitimacy and weight, as well as financing and competency, that has allowed the
DRC to really start playing its proper role internationally within REDD; technical
advances in REDD+ planning...lead to diplomatic and financial advances."1 64 It is hard
to find a more succinct description of the expert community's perception of REDD as an
effective means to put the post-colonial state on the path to progress.
164 Interview CC-024.
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Conclusion
The Greening of State-Building
How to Read REDD+ in the DRC
In his chapter on "Greening the Bank" in The World Bank: The First Half Century,
Robert Wade asks the question about the rise of environmental agenda within the Bank:
"Could the money spent on developing environmental expertise at the bank have been
better spent? Is it improving environmental degradation let alone development?,' 6 5 We
are not asking exactly the same questions, but what can we say in these early stages about
REDD+ and its impact on development in the post-colonial state or its stabilization and
reduction of emissions of carbon? As seen variably through the eyes of the CN-REDD
staff in the DRC, REDD+ is a "transformational" project of forest governance reform
with slim chances of success. My principal contacts in the UN and Bank all at different
points describe REDD+ as a "house of cards", "a nice idea that generated a lot of papers
and conferences," and a project "that had maybe a 3% change of succeeding". The
Congolese engaged on REDD+ in the Ministry of Environment described it variously as a
new "eco-industry" that benefited international NGOs and not the Congolese and "the
latest fashion" of development, which when it passes, "the forest will still be there."
Should REDD+ be encouraged to succeed? Should it be strengthened or drastically
modified? What are the consequences of abstracting forests to a metric of carbon? In the
economic logic of the Bank, REDD makes plenty of sense. Wade's critique at the end of
his lengthy chapter on the rise of environmental management techniques within the Bank
is summed up in the following question and retort: "Does the lower risk of environmental
damage in Bank projects-and the demonstration effects of environmentally sounder
Bank projects on non-Bank projects-outweigh the additional cost of investments? The
question is almost impossible to answer in the absence of clear standards for valuing the
environment and the lack of quantitative information on the environmental impact of
Bank projects." 166 REDD+ provides one of the first means of getting to these "standards"
fusing economic techniques with the environment. In Wade's analysis, the bank moves
through a consciousness of rural resource development that he characterizes as moving
from "frontier economics" to "environmental protection" to "environmental
management." The environmental management regime is what is in full force at the end
of his critique of the Bank's "greening." Now we might say the Bank, and wittingly or
unwittingly the UN along with it, are maturing within this genealogy of sustainable
development with the rise of "ecosystem service investments" and REDD+ that equate to
a greening of state-building in the context of the DRC.
REDD+ introduces new metrics of valuing forests which compete, in an economic sense,
with existing forest "values" that currently put a premium on trees as cut pieces of timber,
blackened pieces of charcoal or cleared for cultivated agriculture. These activities are, in
the expert lingo of REDD+, the "drivers and determinants" of deforestation. If fuel wood
165 Wade, 1997, p 7 3 2 .
166 Ibid, p733.
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and subsistence land clearing, the two principle forms of deforestation in the DRC'67, are
to be dealt with, REDD+ must introduce new fuel sources and alternative cultivation
techniques that augment crop production in exchange for clearing less forestland. In
exchange for producing the global commodity of forest carbon. This commodity is being
structured to be a national commodity, through which the abilities of the nation
themselves are realized. But what about the localities that live next to the forests? The
material misery in many of the villages I visited is palpable. The forest, in many regards,
is the only safety net people have to fall back upon. This is not necessarily lost on the
REDD+ planners. "I would personally not want to support a project that is reducing
output of anything in this country where there are no alternatives. In this country there
are no alternatives. There are no alternatives to slash and burn. There are no alternatives
to wood energy."16 8
But the forest does not simply constitute a matrix of material resources waiting to be
transformed from use values into higher exchange values. What the experts call
deforestation and forest degradation are integral forms of communal knowledge and
practice in the DRC. Part of a rich gemeinschaft. Anna Tsing, in her ethnography
Friction, evokes the complexity of forest peasant life by inhabiting the Indonesian
swidden farmers' view of the forest and its differing stages of regrowth as a whole
spectrum of ecological production. Villagers prepare and treat secondary growth areas in
particular ways that generate resources for them at the same time that they produce
cultural and social ties. In this sense, the forest is socialized in a particular way. Similar
categorizing dynamics are at work in the DRC. For instance, in the gap between farm and
forest in Equateur, where forest land is in the process of being converted back into farm
lands, dead trunks and disturbed lands provide ideal spawning grounds for makombo,
delicious white forest mushrooms that are the delight of any Mongo or Pygmy villager's
evening meal. REDD+ imposes a particular kind of "forest", the official carbon forest,
which might not take into account all of these gemeinschafts.
At the same time, in parts of the Congo I visited, village life is becoming more difficult
due to depleting forest resources. This is especially felt with bush meat, of which the
Congolese are particularly fond. Overhunting of forest of monkeys, small forest gazelles,
Gambian rats, gavials, pangolins, civets, boa constrictors and other rainforest fauna is
talked about in every village I visited in Equateur. Hunters must walk further and further
to catch animals, which are smaller and smaller. Snares go empty for longer and longer.
This phenomenon, sometimes called the "Empty Forest Syndrome", is putting even
further strains on local diets, depriving communities of precious sources of protein.
Rising demographics and increased demand in urban areas for bush meat are the two
principle factors contributing to this situation, neither of which presents many options for
adaptive management if communities continue current practices.
Rising demographics are also having an impact on the nature of crop cultivation. For
instance, in the northern sections of Equateur, near the city of Gemena, the growth of
villages has lead to quicker impoverishment of fallow rainforest soils forcing subsistence
167 FAO and UCL 2011
168 Interview CC-002.
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farmers to open up farm plots deeper and deeper into the forest, days away from their
actual villages. Farm fields more than 15km away from a village are too far to reach and
return from in a single day. This requires most families to open up a second production
household where family members live temporarily during cultivating cycles and where
crops are brought and stored before being walked back to the original village. This puts a
huge strain on villagers who have meager means to support multiple households.
These descriptions of ecological challenges are, for all intents and purposes, expected to
get even more unpredictable with climate change. So how are villagers expected to cope?
What are the chances that the state will be able to deliver services? The state's
involvement at such a local level, according to Joseph Ipalaka, former Secretary General
of the Ministry of Environment and current member of parliament from the region of
Bikoro, is more absent than its ever been. "In the smallest villages, people die because of
a lack of quinine. Access is so difficult that for each parliamentary vacation, the
government would give us a package of 50kg of pharmaceutical products. So that's a
package every 3 months, which we would take with us when we returned home and
wouldn't give to commercial centers, like Tondo or Bikoro, but we would go to the
furthest flung villages and that quinine would save lots of people. Well, now the
government no longer provides even those packages and in those furthest flung villages,
you couldn't even find an aspirin now." 1
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Can REDD+, even to a modest degree, help re-establish attention and services at a sub-
provincial level in the DRC? Can REDD+ respond to the need for increased resiliency,
particularly at the communal level? Is the greening of state building more benign or more
inclusive than other forms of colonial and post-colonial state building? REDD, as long as
it can open its agenda setting process to local groups, has a potential to interact and
strengthen local level institutions. There are reasons to be encouraged.
Unlike performance based payment systems linked to cash transfer and primary
education, which have experience success in keeping children in countries such as
Mexico in school, the potential benefits from REDD + are much more diffuse because
they depend on communal action, not just decisions made at the family level. Changes in
forestry practices must occur at least at the village scale (to prevent that phenomenon of
leakage discussed earlier). Compensation mechanism, on the other hand, will not likely
succeed if they are simply cash transfers. These do not necessarily aggregate the type of
service delivery (i.e. agricultural extension services) that will make community REDD+
successful, because the cash can be spent for other purposes and can be easily captured
by elites. The CN-REDD technocrats see this as a reason for optimism about REDD+,
which they describe as providing the mechanism to create Peter Evans' developmental
statem
Because you cannot traffic carbon, it requires socially that people come
together. It requires social cohesion where you did not have that before. You
don't need social cohesion to cut a tree down and traffic it through the Uganda
169 Interview CC-026.
170 See Evans, 1989.
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border, to Mombasa and on to Dubai. You don't need social cohesion to do that.
Neither do you need social cohesion, in fact it's probably better ifyou don't
have social cohesion to transport cassiterite through Rwanda and Tanzania. So
we're changing the situation.1 7 1
So far, REDD+ and the CN-REDD have been incredibly top-down. They are also
skeptical for reasons discussed of community REDD+. The pilot projects being funded
by the CBFF are encouraging, but currently are only scheduled for 3 years of funding. It
is not the state implementing these, nor the UN or the World Bank, but NGOs that maybe
be gone at the end of their contracts. REDD+ is hardly known outside the capital, in the
DRC. If "REDD hopes to touch the lives of local populations, and yet is managed from
the center in Kinshasa, local populations will see no benefits because they will not be
able to develop the mechanisms that allow them to achieve the aims of REDD, and the
money will vanish into the holes higher up."'172
Part of localizing REDD includes finding ways to bridge informal customary structures
with formal REDD+ architecture is one of these challenges. Establishing Community
Managed Forests would be a step in providing at least legal autonomy to Congolese
communities. To prevent the consequences of FCLs from being perverse, such as in
Cameroon, they need to be structured and constrained in their activities. Informal, small-
scale artisanal logging is already responsible for significant forest depletion. Creating any
legal mechanisms that facilitate illegal logging, while diminishing public good and/or
other community benefits would be an unfortunate outcome of passing the reforms on
FCLs.
And with the design of REDD+ itself: need to strengthen at the international level
guidelines on "performance-based" payments that are linked to the performance of
"livelihood improvements" not just carbon stockage. The construction of these metrics
needs to be collaboratively made. How do we get communities to define themselves and
translate that definition upward to structures such as UN-REDD and the FIP? Resistance
cannot be the only or even the most appropriate response in these cases. Villagers are
eager for opportunities to change the course of the daily miseries with which they
grapple, while at the same time not subjecting themselves to unpredictable forces of
capital. Is this possible? Turning away from REDD does not seem like the right approach
for regions of the globe that are linked to the kind of resource dynamics described above.
REDD+ in a the post-Durban Global Negotiations
The final shape of a REDD+ mechanism is still very much contested at the international
level. At Durban, the negotiators decided to stop negotiating on the Bali Plan at the same
time that they decided to move forward with the Long-term Cooperative Action.
"The SBSTA decision calls for Parties and observers to make submissions by 28
February 2012 to feed into the May 2012 discussions in Bonn. Submissions can include
land tenure issues; forest governance issues; gender considerations and safeguards; and in
171 Interview CC-002.
172 Interview CC-026.
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particular how to address drivers of deforestation and forest degradation and national
forest monitoring. The combination of weak safeguards and inflated baselines makes it
increasingly obvious that REDD+ will not respect forest peoples' rights nor reduce
emissions."m
Resistance to the creation of an international forestry carbon scheme is now being waged
by a coalition of anti-corporate environmental NGOs, such as Greenpeace and Rainforest
Action Network, a robust and growing movement of indigenous rights and forest peoples
groups, and various critics of financial markets. The prime sticking point for these actors
remains whether forest carbon should be tradable as offsets to count as part of developed
country reduction targets, or whether it should be governed as separate, non-
commoditized source of emission reductions. In the latter version, tropical forest
countries might receive payments through bi-lateral contracts for maintaining, or
increasing, their stock of forest carbon, instead of relying on market mechanisms to set
the value and movement of the abstracted carbon offset. At COP 16 in Cancun, the
government of Bolivia blocked the adoption of the Cancun Agreement by the broader
UNFCCC members based on its opposition to language attaching REDD to international
offset mechanisms. The Bolivian ambassador to the UN justified his country's stance by
arguing that forest carbon reductions should not be attributable to reduction targets for
Northern emitters. "The [Cancun] text is full of loopholes for polluters, opportunities for
expanding carbon markets and similar mechanisms - like the forestry scheme REDD -
that reduce the obligation of developed countries to act." 74 Bolivia was the only country
to oppose the UN agreement, yet its opposition did not hinge on a refusal of the concept
of REDD+ but more on its means of finance. Indeed, Bolivia is participating in the UN
REDD program and are a recipient of UN REDD money.
Perhaps the object of carbon, and forest carbon in particular, will prove too difficult to be
governed no matter what the framework of valuation. These uncertainties are being
actively framed and contested by scientists, activists, economists, administrative attaches
and many other actors involved in the "genesis and stabilization" of forest carbon. What
is interesting, however, is that many people who initially cautioned against including the
conversion of forests in any global carbon management scheme, have come to see the
idea of compensating tropical forest countries for reducing deforestation as a positive
development to achieve other goals - such as poverty alleviation, land tenure reform, and
rural development. Notwithstanding the general collapse at COP 15 of an agreement to
extend the Kyoto market-mechanism past 2012, and with it a stable, regulated market for
carbon, REDD+ is an area of the international negotiations that have picked up steam at
Copenhagen and subsequent COPs.
Those concerned with how REDD+ might not just produce carbon benefits, but also
provide another link in addressing global inequities have reason for cautious optimism
173 Dooley, K. and Homer, K., "Durban aimed to save the market, not the climate, December 2011," Forest
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toward development that incorporates carbon management practices. In a state as
institutionally fractured as the Democratic Republic of Congo, if REDD+ can provides a
means to get actors both at the national and state level following certain routines of
"rationalized" behavior, it may help foster a rebirth of institutions which are currently
lacking at all levels of the State. Whether aggregating forms of practice linked to
scientific and technical understandings of carbon can produce institutions remains to be
seen. But it is not enough to simply invite forest communities to "participate" in the
regulation of a predefined carbon. Local populations need to actively collaborate in
defining what "avoiding carbon" means to their livelihoods, so that the REDD+ forest
carbon emissions will become a carbon of liberation, instead of the early shackles of a
new economy of carbon of extraction.
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